

# WTO disciplines on domestic support: pivotal or incidental for agricultural policies in OECD countries?

David Blandford blandford.d@gmail.com

Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness
Research Network
Westin Harbour Castle Hotel, Toronto
May 28, 2011



#### Work on domestic support disciplines

- Initiated in 2005 through International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC)
- Subsequent funding from World Bank (EU and US support simulators)
- IFPRI shadow WTO notifications project
- International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) – Geneva Briefings
- Orden, Blandford and Josling (eds). WTO Disciplines on Agricultural Support: Seeking a Fair Basis for Trade, Cambridge University Press, 2011



# WTO disciplines and domestic support – key questions

- 1. How do the disciplines (UR and Doha) relate to support in major subsidizing countries?
- 2. Are the disciplines actually likely to be binding on support expenditures?
- 3. Are the disciplines likely to cause changes in domestic support policies?



#### WTO domestic support disciplines

- DS one of the three pillars of the UR Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
- Members obliged to notify domestic support
  - Current Total AMS (CTAMS) includes MPS, nonexempt direct payments and other product-specific support
  - □ Blue Box
  - □ Green Box
- CTAMS is supposed to be less than Final Bound Total AMS (FBTAMS) but no explicit sanctions for non-compliance under the AoA




#### Proposed Doha modalities

- New concept Overall Trade Distorting Support
   OTDS = CTAMS + de minimis + blue box
- Tiered reductions in the bound OTDS and the UR FBTAMS
- Reduction in de minimis
- Cap on blue box support
- Product-specific AMS and blue box caps
- How do the existing and proposed modalities relate to notified domestic support?





#### Canada: structure of support




Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications






#### Canada: AMS








#### Canada: AMS & UR de minimis






# Canada: Excess of NPS over Doha de minimis




# Ŋ.

#### Canada: OTDS






## Japan: structure of support



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications




## Japan: AMS






# Japan: AMS & UR de minimis






# Japan: OTDS



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities


#### Korea: structure of support



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications

# Ŋ.


#### Korea: AMS



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities




#### Korea: AMS & UR de minimis




Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities



#### Korea: OTDS




#### Norway: structure of support




Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications

#### Norway: AMS



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities






Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities




### Norway: Blue box



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities




## Norway: OTDS



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities

# NA.


## Switzerland: structure of support



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications




#### Switzerland: AMS






#### Switzerland: OTDS








Note: EU15 to 03/04; EU25 for 04/05 and 05/06; EU27 thereafter

Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications




#### EU: AMS



Note: EU15 to 03/04; EU25 for 04/05 and 05/06; EU27 thereafter Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities

# M


#### EU: AMS & UR de minimis



Note: EU15 to 03/04; EU25 for 04/05 and 05/06; EU27 thereafter Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities




#### EU15: Blue box



Note: EU15 to 03/04; EU25 for 04/05 and 05/06; EU27 thereafter Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities

# M


#### EU: OTDS



Notes: EU15 to 03/04; EU25 for 04/05 and 05/06; EU27 thereafter Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities

# M


### US: structure of support



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications




#### US: AMS






#### US: AMS & UR de minimis



Source: Blandford based on WTO notifications and December 2008 draft modalities




#### US: NPS and the Doha de minimis






#### **US: OTDS**




### US: projections Doha modalities




#### US: projections Doha modalities

Excess of sugar AMS over product-specific binding



#### **US**: projections

"Water" in the FBTAMS is reduced under the Doha disciplines






#### Adapting to the disciplines

- The weakness of the MPS concept
  - □ Eliminating "administered prices", e.g., Japan, Korea, Norway
  - □ Redefining "eligible quantities", e.g., US dairy
  - MPS rarely corresponds to an economic measure of price support (cf. OECD PSE)
- Box inclusion and box shifting
  - ☐ Shifts from amber to blue (e.g., EU, US)
  - ☐ Measures that may not be green (e.g., Norway)
- Doha impact of the total package (three tiers) may be diluted by strategic behavior

# W

# Norway: adapting to the new disciplines



Source: Blandford, Gaasland, Garcia and Vårdal, World Economy, 2010.

# The contribution to policy reform – a mixed picture

- Cosmetic changes in policies are possible to stay within the commitments
- Box shifting that reflects real changes in policy (e.g., EU) can be significant
- Doha commitments could induce policy changes by reducing the room for maneuver in tradedistorting support (e.g., US)
- Overall some international commitments (even if imperfect) are better than none!
- Ultimately the impact of DS commitments will be determined by the strength of overall commitment to multilateral institutions



#### Work on domestic support disciplines

- Copies of the IFPRI Policy Brief: WTO Disciplines on Agricultural Support: Experience to Date and Assessment of the Doha Proposals by Orden, Blandford, Josling and Brink are available
- Live webcast from Washington, DC on June 7, 2011 from 12:15 p.m. 1:45 p.m. EST (see IFPRI website)



# WTO disciplines on domestic support: pivotal or incidental for agricultural policies in OECD countries?

# David Blandford blandford.d@gmail.com

Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness
Research Network
Westin Harbour Castle Hotel, Toronto
May 28, 2011