The Life World, Grief and Individual Uniqueness: 'Social Definition' in Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Weber, Simmel and Schutz*  


Introduction

This article is a meta-theoretical discussion of the assumptions which are central to the Social Definition Paradigm in sociology. The overall objective is a clarification of the Baden School's contribution, realized and potential, to ethnographic research on the human lived experience.

More specifically, it attempts to provide notes toward the study of the intellectual origins of the study of what Schutz and others have called the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and what Rickert and others have called the 'historical individual.' (Rickert also uses the term 'historical centre.') I am concerned with the everyday lived experience of concrete individual human beings but I want to go beyond the common sense assumptions of the actors themselves and yet avoid psychological reductionism or sociological reification.

In terms of philosophical assumptions I am mainly concerned with the philosophical concepts (or, in other words, meta-assumptions) of Wilhelm Dilthey (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936). I examine them briefly and look at their relation to the sociological theories of Max Weber (1864-1920), mainly on the basis of work done by Oakes (1988), but it also will be necessary to comment as well on concepts found in Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Emil Lask (1875-1915), in philosophy, and Alfred Schutz, in sociology. Thus, I will briefly discuss aspects of the philosophical assumptions of Windelband, Lask, Rickert, Weber and Schutz in order to clarify some of the 'meta-paradigmatic' questions concerning epistemology, ontology and philosophical anthropology.

I wish to make it clear that this article is not intended as a complete discussion of issues related to epistemology, ontology and philosophical anthropology, much

less a thorough historical investigation of the history of ideas related to ethnographic research on the human lived experience. The main contribution I wish to make is to clarify the sense in which the Neo-Kantian (as well as Neo-Lotzean and Neo-Fichteans) assumptions found in one stream of ethnographic research on the human lived experience is worth investigating further. By illustrating the rather abstract philosophical problems through an examination of the question of grief I hope to clarify the issues at hand.

This article is broadly theoretical, and even meta-theoretical, but it can be read in conjunction with my more ethnographically descriptive paper on bhakti (devotional) cults (Bakker, 1993a) and my analysis of the social philosophy of M. K. Gandhi (Bakker, 1993b). It is part of my general interest in the analysis of world-views and philosophical assumptions about the nature of 'meaning' (Klemke, 1981). I think it is interesting to examine 'what we care about' (Frankfurt, 1988) because I believe that 'ideas' have consequences.

The 'post-modern' age of technology and instrumental values has meant for many people a minimalization of the self (Lasch, 1984) and a 'broken connection' with morality and values (Lifton, 1979). We have lost sight of the 'four cardinal virtues' (Pieper, 1965) and have radically altered our conceptualization of 'love' (Singer, 1987). Thus, I believe that a thorough re-examination of meta-paradigmatic assumptions is necessary if we are going to follow 'a path with heart' (Kornfield, 1993) and establish a 'just society' and a 'just civilization' (Bakker, 1993b).

Social Definition Research Paradigm

I am basically concerned here with the Research Paradigm that George Ritzer calls the 'Social Definition' Paradigm, and that has gone under various labels. As Ritzer points out (1992: 527): 'Social definitionists, ... , are more likely to use the observation method than those in any other paradigm. In other words, observation is the distinctive methodology of social definitionists.' He lists a number of different 'theories' as part of the Social Definition Paradigm: Action Theory, Symbolic Interactionism, Phenomenology (i.e. Phenomenological Sociology), Ethnomethodology and Existentialism (i.e. Existentialist Sociology). He distinguishes the Social Definition Paradigm from the 'Social Facts' and the 'Social Behavior' Paradigms. Thus, I would like to look more closely at the qualitative ethnographic tradition of research in sociology. (There will also be some mention of cultural anthropology, particularly Clifford Geertz' concept of 'thick description.') I am particularly interested in the intellectual origins of that qualitative ethnographic research tradition. I believe that the many rivers that have flown into the Social Definition Research Paradigm should be more carefully analyzed.

Prus has recently argued (1994) that the ethnographic study of everyday life lived experience can be traced to Wilhelm Dilthey, through George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer. He argues that current ethnographic work is heavily indebted to Dilthey's philosophical insights, as translated by Mead and later by Blumer. While I have no objection to that analysis, I also believe there is more to the story.

In particular, I believe another important strand of the study of everyday life must be traced back to The Baden or Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism, particularly the work of Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert. If we are going to pay attention to Dilthey then we must also consider the contributions made by Windelband and Rickert. Rickert's 'Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science' (Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (1902)) and his later Grundprobleme der Philosophie (1934) are important works that have been ignored by most 'Social Definitionists' other than Weber, Schutz and other classical writers. (For example, most Symbolic Interactionists have not attempted to study Rickert's philosophy of science.) Rickert's formulation strongly influenced Max Weber's conceptualization of 'ideal types' and Verstehen. Rickert's ideas also influenced Georg Simmel and Edmund Husserl, although perhaps not as directly. Weber and Husserl, of course, strongly influenced Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Sociology and, hence, Berger and Luckmann's Social Construction of Reality (1967). They, in turn, influenced many North American Symbolic Interactionists and Ethnomethodologists. All of these writers, in turn, have had an impact on the theories put forward by Jürgen Habermas.

There are many kinds of sociology and many kinds of sociologists. However, if we try to classify the different kinds of sociological endeavor we can begin by recognizing a difference between studying human lived experience and studying aspects of human life that are not necessarily part of the ordinary lived experience of most people. The two aspects of human life overlap to a certain extent, of course, but they are analytically separable. Thus, for example, when sociologists study macro structural issues which are related to class, status and power at the institutional level they are not necessarily studying micro aspects of ordinary lived experience, even though class, status and power can have a tremendous impact on everyday life. Much current ethnographic research in the Symbolic Interactionist paradigm concentrates more on everyday life and focuses less on macro structural issues. Thus, for example, a study of shuffleboard among senior citizens or a study of techniques used by students when taking exams is usually carried out on the basis of an examination of everyday life lived experience. On the other hand, a study of corporate network linkages or of a major industry is usually more concerned with macro structures.
The Baden or Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism and Dilthey

Guy Oakes, in addition to translating important parts of Weber’s methodological writings, has also written (1987, 1988) an excellent analysis of the impact of Neo-Kantianism on Weber. The impact of the Baden or Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism on Weber is well documented. Weber’s letters for the first decade of this century have been published in the MWG.5

The leading figure in the Baden School in the 1890s was Wilhelm Windelband. His inaugural lecture as rector (i.e. President) of Strasbourg University on ‘History and Natural Science’ (Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft, 1894) strongly influenced Heinrich Rickert’s work. Essentially, Windelband – and later Rickert – rejected Dilthey’s distinction between the natural and the social sciences. Also important to the Baden School is Emil Lask (1875-1915), Rickert’s doctoral student at Freiburg (dissertation on Fichte’s Idealism, 1901) and Windelband’s post-doctoral student at Strasbourg and Heidelberg (1896-98). Lask joined Windelband and Rickert in rejecting Dilthey’s distinction between the natural and the moral (or soul) sciences.

Wilhelm Dilthey (1831-1911), as you may recall, had based his distinction on metaphysical grounds which involve a distinction between strictly natural phenomena and phenomena which involve more than nature. The Geisteswissenschaften concern the study of Geist or ‘spirit’ (Plantinga, 1980). The human spirit or soul is considered by Dilthey to be more than merely ‘natural.’ Hence, the human psyche is distinct from that of all other animals and it is necessary to interpret human thought and action on the basis of hermeneutic understanding (Dilthey, tr. by Rickman, 1976). The Geisteswissenschaften are essentially moral disciplines.6 Dilthey’s distinction between the natural and the spiritual (or soul, or moral) sciences is no longer generally accepted.

What is generally accepted today is a distinction between natural sciences and cultural or social sciences. That distinction comes, in part, from Windelband and Rickert. Windelband and Rickert are not so much concerned with the ‘object’ of research as with the ‘methodology’ of research. In 1894 Windelband distinguished between the study of individual events and the study of large number of events. Both types of study can be ‘scientific’ in the sense of the word Wissenschaft, or ‘disciplined inquiry.’ Thus, we can have disciplined inquiry dealing with unique, individual events or disciplined inquiry dealing with large categories of events. The terms Windelband used are idioetric (i.e. the description of unique events and phenomena) and nomothetic (i.e. the analysis of large categories of events and phenomena into laws or law-like regularities). Windelband considered the historical disciplines to be idioetric and the natural sciences to be predominately nomothetic. He argued strongly against the view that the idio-

5. The exact impact of the Baden School on Weber’s thought is still a matter of debate among scholars.
6. Key concepts in Rickert’s epistemology are ‘the historical in dividual’ and ‘value-relevance.’ Also important is Rickert’s distinction between ‘values’ and ‘value-judgements.’ Lask contributed to a strengthening of the Kantian idea of the irrational hiatus (hiatus irrationalis) between concept and reality. Lask also analyzed theories of concept formation and theories of value judgement. All of those ideas had an impact on Max Weber (Oakes, 1987: 434).

There may be problematic aspects in Rickert’s epistemology and ontology, as Oakes points out. In terms of his epistemology we can point to Rickert’s emphasis on valuation. He argues in favor of cultural sciences as Wissenschaften which are based on the value-relevance of cultural norms. However, it may be that value-relevance emerges in the first instance as a result of valuation. What follows is the basis of valuation? If we reject Kant’s categorical imperative we are not left with any kind of binding ethical imperatives. Without binding ethical imperatives we cannot have valuation. Without valuation we may not be able to have value-relevance either! As Oakes states:

In Rickert’s work the distinction between hypothetically binding cultural norms and categorically binding ethical imperatives is blurred, if not erased altogether (Oakes, 1987: 444).

It is not possible to maintain the distinction between ‘value-relevance’ and ‘value-freedom’ in quite the manner that Rickert argued.

In terms of ontology it may also be a valid criticism to point out that Rickert may
at times have tended to assume that reality can exist independently of its conceptualization, even though at other times he tended to emphasize the Kantian absolute duality of concept and reality (i.e. the hiatus irrationalis). If there is an irreducible gap between concept and reality (i.e. between map and territory, between musical score and sound, etc.) then we cannot introduce ‘reality’ as a test of our concepts without some philosophical ambiguity. In other words, if social reality is merely a construction, then anything goes. We are stuck with complete and radical cultural relativism. Yet, Rickert wanted to be able to make some ethical and moral judgments. Without some kind of grounding in some kind of reality it is difficult to argue in favor of any ethical or moral position.

Geisteswissenschaften?

It is important to note the significant differences in meta-paradigmatic assumptions between Dilthey, on the one hand, and Windelband, Lask and Rickert, on the other. For Dilthey the criterion that demarcates natural science from other forms of science is the ontology of the subject matter, i.e. the object of investigation. Dilthey believed that natural science studies nature while Geisteswissenschaften study Geist. The concept of Geist refers essentially to morality, ethics, human meaning and human purpose. Thus, the concept of Geist is often translated as the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ or ‘psyche.’ Only human beings have Geist; animals and inanimate objects like stars and rocks do not have Geist.

In his arguments concerning Geist Dilthey is squarely within a Christian (or ‘Judeo-Christian-Islamic’) cultural tradition. The Judeo-Christian-Islamic concept of ‘individualism,’ as developed especially since the Enlightenment secularization of Christian ideas, is part and parcel of the common sense, North American and European concept of the self. That concept is also found in certain aspects of psycho-analysis (Lasch, 1984: 258). It is so basic to our received, cultural understanding of the world – our worldview – that we do not often stop to question it. However, phenomenological work requires that the concept of Geist be bracketed.

There are other, radically different views of the human or the ‘soul.’ The philosophical arguments concerning the nature of the human ‘soul’ are complex. In Theravada Buddhism, for example, it is argued that the human soul does not exist. The doctrine of ‘not-self’ (Pali anatta; Sanskrit anatman) is complex and runs directly counter to common sense assumptions about the self. Certainly, however, North American or European ‘common sense’ (i.e. Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman) assumptions about what a human individual is cannot be regarded as universal. Western thinking about ‘persons, selves, their nature and their activities’ represent specific cultural products (Collins, 1982: 3; Tweed, 1992). Certain schools of Buddhism have refused to accept the Brahmanical concept of the soul or the self (Sanskrit atman or purusha-prakriti). The denial of the self is, therefore, partially a product of the dialectic of thought which characterized the Indian sub-continent circa 500 B.C.E.

If we posit a Geisteswissenschaft then we assume the secularized Judeo-Christian-Islamic concept of a Geist rather than the Hindu concept of atman or the Buddhist concept of anatta. Most sociologists do not fully appreciate the implicit assumption that Dilthey made. Since the concept of the self, as understood in Western Europe and North America since the Industrial Revolution and Enlightenment, is so much a part of our everyday, taken-for-granted Lebenswelt we tend to forget that it is merely a philosophical assumption. There are other societies and civilizations which have different cultural assumptions about the self or the soul. There are other cultures which do not accept the notion of Geist. Furthermore, our own conceptualization of the concept of the individual person has changed dramatically (Pieper, 1960; Russell, 1994; Singer, 1987; Lasch, 1984; Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973). When we make the leap from Geisteswissenschaften to ‘social sciences’ we are jumping intellectually from one set of ontological, epistemological and philosophical anthropological assumptions to another, usually without awareness that that is what we are doing. Social scientists, no less than ordinary individuals, often suffer from ‘illusions of certainty’ regarding assumptions of everyday life experience. We think that many things which are really relative are absolute. However, instead of being ‘natural’ they are quite ‘cultural.’

Max Weber’s Epistemology and Methodology

There has been a great deal written about Max Weber’s methodology. Here I wish to stress the basic fact that, as Guy Oakes has argued (1987), Weber accepted many aspects of the Baden School idea of a Kulturwissenschaft (cultural science). However, contrary to the opinion expressed by Duncan (1969: 96-97), I believe he also wrote about sociology from the perspective of Geisteswissenschaften. I believe that Weber’s conceptualization of the cultural sciences was based on both Dilthey and Rickert. While it may seem that Weber emphasized Rickert’s Kulturwissenschaften rather than Dilthey’s concept of a Geisteswissenschaft (moral of soul science), that is not necessarily the case. For Weber sociology is the study of historical individuals who make concrete value commitments in the context of particular cultures. All human beings are cultural beings. We take a position on human reality on the basis of cultural assumptions. We ascribe meaning to the world on the basis of our culture. Social phenomena, according to Weber, have a cultural significance to us as human individuals. Culture itself is the concrete value commitments of individual persons. We ascribe meaning to human phenomena and we value those phenomena on the basis of the meaning that we have attributed to them.
Weber adopted some aspects of the Baden School’s epistemological and ontological arguments but he did not tackle them systematically. He picked what he wanted and he left the rest. He was not principally interested in philosophy but in historically-grounded interpretive sociology. Hence, he may actually have mis-interpreted some of the arguments made by Windelband, Rickert and Lask. We can give Weber the benefit of the doubt and assume that he did not so much mis-interpret as adapt. He adapted those aspects of the Baden School philosophy he found useful for his theorizing and research and did not fully engage other aspects of the epistemological and ontological arguments that were raised. Thus, for example, Weber is generally read as claiming that ideal types can and should be compared with reality. But as we have seen the concept of ‘reality’ is problematic, given the Kantian and Neo-Kantian emphasis on the _hiatus irrationalis_. Oakes argues that ‘It is possible only to compare reality as constituted by some ideal type with reality as constituted by another ideal type’ (Oakes, 1987: 445). Weber did not take his arguments concerning ideal types to that extreme limit. For Kant himself the escape hatch was the notion of synthetic a priori categories. For Husserl it was also possible to speak of a priorisms. Weber has no such epistemological grounding for his ideal types. Therefore, we may have to resort to an argument from purely heuristic or pragmatic expediency. We can treat common sense ideal types in our own cultural milieu as the equivalent of ‘reality,’ even though — rigorously considered – they too are merely manifestations of constructions. In a sense, we choose to ‘suspend disbelief’ when it comes to our own cultural values and norms. I believe that is certainly the case in many North American and European studies done by Symbolic Interactionists and Ethnomethodologists. For example, a study of racism or anti-racism that assumes that racism is bad is not necessarily based on a philosophically well-grounded analysis of the ontological basis of concrete individuality and universal human rights. Weber’s comparative and historical understanding went much further than most Symbolic Interactionist and Ethnomethodological accounts. His use of _Verstehen_ was based on a radical awareness of the relativity of cultural assumptions. For Weber even the most basic norms and values of any particular society could be questioned. In the _Werturteilsstreit_ Weber accepted the _hiatus irrationalis_ notion of the Neo-Kantians, but he nevertheless also allowed for the importance of contextualized value commitments (‘value relevance’).

He thus modified Rickert’s views concerning _Kultur_ on the basis of the epistemological thrust toward _Geist_ and ‘valuation’ that is found in Dilthey’s work.

For Weber, meaning structures at the level of individual social action are determined to a very large degree by cultural values and norms. The significance of personalized aspects of the broader macro structures of cultural meaning can perhaps be best understood by examination of concrete aspects of everyday life experience. (In part two of this paper we will examine the grieving process with this assumption about meaning as a central aspect of the explanation.)

There are many ‘generic social processes’ that require utilization of our capacity to grasp meaning. One such ‘generic process’ is ‘loving.’ Thus, for example, we can contrast the cultural situation of belief in monogamy with the cultural situation of belief in polygamy or polyandry. In a culture that prizes monogamy the concrete historical individual is likely to ascribe value to monogamy and ascribe meaning to a monogamous relationship. In most of Europe and North America there has emerged – for complex historical reasons – a notion of the uniqueness of romantic love relationships in monogamous pairing bonds. Of course, there are many examples of cultures that accept or even promote polygamy and/or polyandry. Much of Weber’s verstehende Soziologie is an attempt at rigorously conceptualizing such cultural variation. Another related example is the cultural standard applied to the conceptualization of ‘gender roles’ and ‘gender identity.’ Our everyday, common sense understanding of sex and gender is often very superficial. As Laqueur has shown (1990), ‘gender’ is very much a matter of social construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and ‘definition of the situation.’ Even biological sex was viewed quite differently in the eighteenth century. Some of the complexities of essentialist versus constructivist versions of sex and gender (or, ‘sex-gender’) are discussed by Dollimore (1991) in a panoramic consideration of ‘sexual dissidence’ from Augustine to Wilde and from Freud to Foucault. The point I wish to make here is simply that even as basic an aspect of the _Lebenswelt_ as gender is not fully understood when we simply take ‘common sense’ for granted. The common sense of the 1990s is far different from the common sense of the 1950s and the common sense of the 1950s is quite different, in turn, from the common sense of the 1890s (Lasch, 1977).

Since cultural phenomena have a cultural significance for individual, concrete historical actors it is not possible to study such phenomena without some degree of interpretive understanding or _Verstehen_. We cannot study the value ascribed by individuals to monogamy in the same way as we study the occurrence of an eclipse or the structure of DNA. ‘The individual datum is relevant to natural science only to the extent that it can be represented as a type, an instance of a generic concept, or a case that can be subsumed under a general law’ (Oakes, 1987: 437). However, no general law can adequately explain a concrete individual in all of his or her singularity. Hence, our theoretical interest as historians, anthropologists or ethnographic sociologists in unique and singular individual persons or events cannot be satisfied by a nomothetic approach. Hence, according to Weber, what we need is a sociology that is rooted in historical description. Similarly, according to Geertz (1973), what we need for interpretive understanding is ‘thick description.’

Georg Simmel

It is interesting to note that Georg Simmel (1858-1918), who significantly influ-
enced George Herbert Mead, Robert Park and others at Chicago, and whose writing had a significant impact on North American sociology, distinguished between natural science as a Wissenschaft of abstract, universal concepts (a Begriffswissenschaft) and history as a Wissenschaft concerned with 'reality' or the immediately given (a Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). That distinction is borrowed by Rickert. Both Simmel and Rickert argue that the validity of concepts in the natural sciences depends on abstraction from concrete reality. Hence, they argue, natural science concepts are not dependent on concrete reality or the real existence of concrete individual entities. The biologist is not interested in any specific whale; she or he is interested in the whale as a type of mammal. The historian, on the other hand, is interested in very specific features of a particular situation, such as the norms governing marriage in eighteenth century France or the values that are accepted by Javanese people influenced by Hindu-Buddhist political ideas in the eighth century.  

Simmel, of course, also elaborated a conceptualization of sociology which he called 'formal sociology' (Coser, 1971). It was to be a 'geometrical' formalism. Certain features of concrete reality are abstracted. Pure forms are constructs and not concrete reality itself. While he agreed that particular historical events are unique, he also believed that there can be an underlying uniformity. As part of his strategy of social forms Simmel constructed theories concerning social types (e.g. the stranger, the man in the middle, the poor). Simmel's analysis of the significance of numbers in social life (e.g. the difference between a dyad and a triad) is also part of his formal sociology. In addition to his formal sociology Simmel also wrote on specific historical topics and he was clearly aware of the methodological struggles that Weber was concerned with. There is much overlap between Weber's and Simmel's methodologies; but there are also significant differences.

Thus, for example, Lee's analysis of the 'colors of love' (1973) is very much in the tradition of Simmel's formal sociology but nevertheless also contains Weberian assumptions about social action. Similarly, work by Zerubavel (1985) on the social construction of 'the week' would also seem to bridge the methodological prescriptions of the two thinkers. Nevertheless, Simmel's views on formal sociology set him apart from Weber. Weber's generalizations tend to be based on comparison of historical 'reality' with ideal types. Weber's ideal types are not the same thing as Simmel's pure, formal types. The issue is complex and requires further investigation. In any case, both Weber and Simmel clearly reject 'the cult of the fact' (Hudson, 1972). Neither thinker takes a purely behavioristic or positivistic methodological stance. Simmel's emphasis on social types seems to have had the greater impact on Symbolic Interactionism in North America. Weber's views on ideal types, on the other hand, had a more significant impact on Phenomenological Sociology. Thus, I would like to briefly mention Alfred Schutz.

**Alfred Schutz**

While it is well known that Schutz's (1899-1959) work is based on Edmund Husserl's (1859-1938) phenomenology, the contribution of Weber's methodological, ontological and epistemological insights (which derive from the Baden School) is less well known. When Schutz writes about typifications he is basically concerned with what might be called 'everyday life ideal types.' Weber was concerned with ideal types as heuristic tools for the historical, cultural sciences. Schutz extended the concept to the typifications of everyday life situations. Thus, for example, all symbol systems involve typification. For example, language involves typifications. The rules of syntax and grammar are 'ideal types' of everyday reality. Language is a kind of storehouse or treasure house of typifications. When we learn other languages we quickly grasp the way in which language usage is a construction of reality and not reality itself. The word is not the object referred to. Thus, in Indonesian we can talk about an anjing and in English we can talk about a dog. The two words can be translated as meaning the same, but culturally they really refer to quite different phenomena. In Canada we keep dogs as pets; in parts of Indonesia (e.g. North Sumatra, North Sulawesi) dogs are livestock, for human consumption. So, an anjing is not quite the same as a dog. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is relevant here. Our use of language definitely shapes our conceptualization of reality. That is in part because language determines our everyday life ideal types. Schutz, by analogy, called such typifications recipes.

There are all kinds of recipes that we follow in everyday life and ethnomethodologists have described many of them in concrete detail. For example, in accomplishing a telephone conversation we follow all kinds of recipes that have to do with initial greetings, conversational patterns and final closings. To take one example, in Europe it is customary to answer the phone by giving your name; in North America it is more usual to answer by saying: 'Hi' or 'Hello,' without identifying yourself. We all use recipes to handle the manifold details of everyday life. The vicissitudes of human lived experience are too numerous to be covered in every respect by recipes, but whenever possible we resort to recipes if at all possible. Unless, of course, something occurs which causes us to stand back from lived experience in a non-routine manner (For example, a death in the family or the loss of an intimate relationship might cause us to drop recipes for awhile as part of the grieving process.) Then we may practice a kind of everyday life epoche or 'bracketing.' The professional sociological observer interested in the ethnography of everyday life, of course, practices bracketing all the time during his or her research work. (It is also a kind of professional hazard, since it is hard to stop bracketing common sense reality once you have engaged in it for awhile!)

Schutz' concept of the Lebenswelt (Lifeworld) stems from the Baden School. However, in Schutz's conceptualization the Lebenswelt is a social reality, not a
private reality. Thus, for example, dreams and reveries are not necessarily part of the Lebenswelt. Furthermore, Schutz has definite ideas on which aspects of the Lebenswelt are acceptable for cultural scientific description and analysis. The past (Vorwelt) and the future (Folgewelt) are definitely out. Similarly, the world of ‘we relations’ (Umwelt) also cannot be examined by a phenomenological sociologist with any degree of rigor. That leaves the world of ‘they relations’ (Mitwelt). We relate to people in the Mitwelt as ‘types’ and not as concrete historical individuals. Out of sight is not necessarily out of mind. Someone we once knew very well but who is no longer part of our ‘we relations’ (Umwelt) may become part of our theoretical world of ‘they relations’ (Mitwelt). Thus, for example, a love relationship which has ended may, after a considerable period of time, be something that we can analyze relatively objectively, even though while we were involved in the love relationship we may have ‘bestowed’ the love object with qualities that others might not have seen (a ‘halo effect’). That would help to explain why some people stay in overtly or covertly abusive relationships long past the time that others would have left. Of course the cultural scientist observing ‘they relations’ is somewhat more removed than the ordinary person in everyday life, but the process is similar.

The insights found in Schutz’s phenomenological sociology are rooted in Schutz’s profound interpretation of Weber. Schutz rounds out Weber’s empirical work by focusing Weber’s key methodological assumptions. Schutz was highly critical of Weber’s epistemological assumptions, but nevertheless Schutz’s work benefits greatly from Weber’s earlier path breaking analyses. Thus, Schutz’s work also has Neo-Kantian roots.

The social construction of reality is insidious in that we carry with us many assumptions about ‘reality’ but do not often bother to look at them very closely. For example, we rarely stop to question the use of our decimal number system and the invention of ‘place value’ (Barrow, 1992). However, when we experience the deep shock of grief we are led to question the common sense assumptions of everyday life. The study of grieving is important because grieving is a generic social process which has many ironic overtones. It is possible to generalize about grief, yet the individual person who grieves feels that grief as a unique experience. To make sociological generalizations about grief requires us to be objective about one of the most subjective of human emotions. The grieving person is shocked by the loss of a ‘love object’ but experiencing deep feelings precisely because that object was not a reified object. The lost love object was the embodiment (the ‘objectification’) of human meaning. Human meaning, on the other hand, ultimately cannot be explained except by recourse to some concept similar to Geist. If we wish to escape from an infinite regress we must posit some kind of ground of value. But if we wish to remain attuned to the high degree of cultural relativity that characterizes human life and lived experience then it is extremely difficult to establish a grounding for values. Hence, the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in the Natur-Geistes-Sozial-wissenschaften!

Once we begin to tackle the nature of ‘objectivity’ in the social sciences, however, we are forced to ask some deep philosophical questions about the epistemological basis for knowledge. By taking the Baden School approach to the demarcation of cultural sciences we can escape the essentialism of a one-sided application of Dilthey’s concept of Geisteswissenschaften.

But, with that we are still not completely in the clear. We need to also consider the ways in which analysis of concrete, historical reality requires more than purely idiographic (or ‘thick’) description. Social science and historical research require the use of concepts, whether we call them ‘ideal types’ or ‘pure types’ or ‘generic concepts.’ The use of such typological concepts requires some version of ‘value relevance’ and meaning. In other words, we cannot entirely dispense with Geist, either. It would be as wrong to utilize a one-sided Rickert-style Kulturwissenschaft as it is to over-emphasize a one-sided Dilthey-style Geisteswissenschaft. Social science should encompass a synthesis of both. For Weber, verstehende Soziologie was meant to do just that. Weber’s general methodological ideas were then further translated and adapted to the study of everyday life by Schutz.

Yet the justification for the use of abstract, generalizing concepts is not clearly given in either Dilthey’s writings or in the writings of the Baden School! The approach taken here is that ideal types are only useful for interpretation of human meaning in everyday lived reality if we keep in mind that it is individual human beings who construct social reality. Even in highly technologized societies, where instrumental means are used to accomplish goal-rational ends through a rational utility calculus, there are still instances of the valuation of individuals as uniquely meaningful. Individuals continue to embody meaning. In fact, it may be that with modernity the individual person becomes the epitome of the embodiment of meaning in a way that is not true of pre-industrial, pre-technologized societies. Individual uniqueness is experienced by human beings in North America and Europe when confronted by the sudden and irrevocable loss of a ‘love object.’ Thus, the analysis of grief provides some empirical grounding for the kinds of things that Windelband, Lask and Rickert were trying to establish.

Oakes (1988), after carefully study of Rickert’s concepts, concludes that Rickert has not made a convincing case for cultural science. Luckily, Weber did not accept all aspects of Rickert’s epistemological, ontological and philosophical anthropological arguments. Further study of the differences between the Baden School and Weber’s methodology would be heuristic for the continued development of the methodology of ethnographic research. We cannot naively ground ethnographic research in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey without also carefully considering the work of Wilhelm Windelband, Emil Lask and Heinrich Rickert.
Grief and Grieving

I would like to briefly deal with an aspect of a generic social process of everyday lived reality in technologized societies that is a good example of a problem for the ethnographic study of the lived experience of human social actors. That topic is grief and the process of grieving. Grief is a particular kind of 'shock' experience. When we lose someone or something that we value greatly then we are forced to comfort the world of our constructed meaning and required to do without that which previously embodied meaning. Our 'common sense' reality suddenly becomes 'dream-like' and shadowy. In the first aftermath of a loss it is common for people to feel that they have been forced into a 'black hole' or an 'empty space.' The shock is experienced as very real.

I am particularly guided by the insightful work by Peter Marris on the nature of adult attachment. Marris (1982) explicitly bases his work on the ideas of John Bowlby (1973a) and Jean Piaget (1971). But it is quite clear that implicitly his general conceptualization is interpretive and fits in well with the ethnographic or Social Definition paradigm. In particular, he uses Piaget's concept of stages of cognitive understanding but adapts it to what he calls 'the structure of meaning'. The structure of meaning is an individual's social construction of reality, particularly with regard to close, affective relationships. Marris is particularly interested in bereavement. He argues that bereavement can be seen as a loss of meaning, or, more precisely, a loss of the embodiment of meaning which leads people to assume, for a time, that meaning has been lost as well. He makes the penetrating suggestion that in the case of a death or sudden loss people work through grief by transforming the meaning of their relationship to the person they have lost, not by abandoning it.

Thus, for example, a husband whose wife has left him will not be consoled by the notion that there are 'plenty of fish in the sea.' That may be useful eventually, but during the initial period of deep grief, when life seems like a black hole, the instrumentalist, goal-rational approach to women and relationships is not likely to provide much solace. Similarly, a mother whose child has died in a car accident is not likely to feel much better if told that she is still young enough to have another child! The lost wife or child is viewed by the husband or mother as unique. The loss of someone with whom we have a unique relationship is the source of much sadness.

Of course, in the long run it is necessary to redefine one's relationship with someone who is no longer present, either physically or emotionally. One way to accomplish the redefinition of the relationship and the situation is to remove the lost love object from one's daily consciousness. If that is not possible, it may nevertheless be possible to take some distance from the lost love object by think-

ing about them in a different way. Thus, for example, the deceased husband or wife can be thought of as inhabiting another 'world.' That world could be a 'spirit world' of some kind (e.g. the Jewish or Christian notion of heaven, or the Hindu or Buddhist concept of reincarnation). For a person who is a strict materialist and does not believe in an everlasting soul or atman it is harder to accept a death, but there are ways of distancing the person. Thus, for example, in some Buddhist traditions there is emphasis on the concept of 'no permanent soul' (Pali, anatta). A Buddhist who believes there is no permanent soul must confront the death of a loved parent or child, spouse or other relative, from the standpoint of one who has no believe in a heaven and only a very abstract form of reincarnation. (In popular, folk Buddhism, of course, the concept of reincarnation is often interpreted very literally and there is even a notion of a heavenly abode.)

Whatever one's religious theology or personal Weltanschauung the death of a person who embodies meaning requires significant adjustment. The grief is often no less deep when the loss does not involve death but otherwise involves the ending of the relationship. A woman whose husband or lover has left her for another woman is at least as prone to experience deep grief as a woman whose husband or lover has died. She then has to have recourse to some ideology that will allow her to redefine the relationship and see the love object in a new light. (Similarly, the same applies to heterosexual men who lose their wife or lover. And, the same applies to homosexual women or men who lose a partner or lover.) The sense of loss and the feeling of deep grief ('the black hole') is not limited to the loss of a spouse, relative, partner or lover. It also can extend to relationships which might seem, on the surface, to be less committed. The key factor is the way in which the person embodies meaning. Similarly, by extension, the term 'love object' is used here not to be pedantic but to make it clear that deep grief does not only occur in a situation where the loss involves death or separation from a person. If the 'love object' is one's work, one's country of origin, one's eyesight or hearing, or even one's pet or house, then the loss can produce a psychological feeling of grief. The depth of commitment to the lost love object is not determined by the inherent worthiness of the object but by the extent to which that object somehow embodies meaning for the grieveor.

Basically there has to be a re-thinking of the relationship. The day to day contact is no longer there; the love object has been removed from direct, face-to-face (or person to object) human contact. He or she (or it) is no longer part of the bereaved person's Umwelt. However it is done, it is always difficult, at best, for people to remove the lost love object from their Umwelt (i.e. the immediate world of close, personal relationships, a world with a high degree of affect and emotion) to their Mitwelt (i.e. a world where people are known basically as 'types' and affect is not intensely personal). For some people the Mitwelt includes a 'spirit world.' For others the Mitwelt is conceptualized as more abstract. But just as one's Mitwelt can
include famous people, dead or alive, real or fictitious, known to practically everyone in the culture (e.g. Marilyn Monroe, J.F.K., Jane Fonda, Mr. Spock and Dr. Spock in North America), it is also possible to conceptualize the lost love object as part of the Mitwelt.

Bowlby (1973b) reports on studies of widows in England. The grief-stricken widow has to reconceptualize her life. She is able to do so, according to Bowlby, only when the essential meaning of the relationship with her dead husband is reformulated. The widow (or widower) is confronted with a unique situation. She (or he) is not concerned with abstract, formal qualities of social structure or natural laws concerning disease, aging and dying. The concern is with the concrete here and now of bereavement. It is precisely the uniqueness of the lost love object is precisely what causes the grief. The lost love object 'embodies' meaning and purpose. With the object gone the embodiment of meaning is gone, too. Hence, it is only natural to assume, for awhile, that meaning and purpose are also lost.

Grief, Uniqueness and the Lebenswelt

Gradually a griever begins to suffer less when he or she is able to relativize the relationship and the unique love object and remove him, her or it from the Umwelt.

When the social psychological adjustment has been made then it is possible to find a meaningful place for the memories in the Mitwelt, or even several Mitwelten. The precise form that the redefinition of the relationship takes will be influenced very strongly by the kind of construction of the Mitwelt that the griever feels comfortable with. If the griever is a devout Roman Catholic housewife and mother in Italy whose husband has died of old age after a long and fruitful life then it may be possible for her to reinterpret him as existing in the Mitwelt of ‘heaven’ and also the Mitwelt of distant grandchildren in Canada. If the griever is a devout Buddhist peasant woman from Thailand whose husband has died of old age after a long and fruitful life then it may be possible for her to reinterpret him as existing in the Mitwelt of another incarnation at some other time and in some other place, as well as the Mitwelt of distant grandchildren in France.

Windelband, Rickert and Lask stressed the notion that the cultural sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences, study the unique and concrete. However, as Peter Marris has pointed out (1982: 186):

Uniqueness is an inherently paradoxical subject for theoretical treatment, since theory presupposes [some degree of] generalizability. Unique relationships can only be thought about, as a class, in terms of what they share in common.

That causes some philosophers of science to jump to the fallacious conclusion that thinking about anything in terms of properties that object has in common with other objects of the same type or class is a sufficient way of conceptualizing that object. Marris terms that fallacy reductionism. His use of the term reductionism is slightly different from the use of the term by those who are concerned with the reductionism that involves moving from a macro level analysis to a more micro level of analysis, but it is essentially the same argument.

The Baden School and Max Weber all assume that the individual human being is a unique and concrete reality. The individual is a unique embodiment. The individual human being is an ontological object that has structure, not just form or ‘spirit.’ Rickert’s ‘historical individual’ is not the class of all individuals but the specific and concrete individual. For example, rather than speak of ‘charismatic religious leaders’ we can talk about ‘Martin Luther,’ ‘Mohandas K. Gandhi’ or some less well known individual who has charismatic qualities. It is hard to avoid falling in the trap of reductionism when we try to provide sociological or anthropological answers to questions about the social action of unique individuals. In trying to avoid reductionistic views we may fall into the equal but opposite fallacy of over-valuation of the individual: the ‘Great Man’ or ‘Great Woman’ theory of history. We either fall into some kind of Freudian or Marxian reductionism and look for ‘schizophrenics’ or ‘alienated proletarians’ or we fall into some kind of Existentialist over-valuation or hero worship of particular individuals (e.g. Schindler’s list; Marilyn Monroe; Albert Einstein).

As Marris explains (1982: 186-189) such under- or over-valuation (collectivity as everything or superhero as everything) also leads to rigid gender identities and oppressive gender roles. We have all heard people talk about ‘the opposite sex’ as if all individuals who belong to that class are the same. (For example, some men going through a divorce may comment that ‘All women are alike; they will take you for all you are worth.’ Similarly some radical, separatist feminists tend to categorize all individual men under the label of patriarchal oppressors, regardless of concrete historical circumstances.) We have also all heard simplistic hero worship. (It is reflected, for example, in the Playboy pinup or the outrageously high salaries given to some professional athletes and CEOs.)

In everyday life we tend to become more attached to certain individuals than to others. In fact, for most purposes anyone who did not value some individuals over others would be considered seriously deviant. Outside of the ideology of some religious traditions (e.g. Hindu and Buddhist non-attachment; Christian agape) there is a feeling that some people are more important to us than others. Only ‘saints’ and ‘mahatmas’ (Bakker, 1993c) value all human beings alike.21 That is because we have only limited time and limited opportunities for being with people. Our Lebenswelt is not a ‘given.’ It is something that results from complex social processes and that is shaped over historical time. Yet our everyday life assumptions about social reality are so deeply ingrained that it is very difficult to continually remain aware of their embeddedness.
Social Definition

From a Social Facts Research Paradigm perspective it is possible to think of the human individual as merely a kind of social 'atom.' Certainly the Utilitarianism of modern capitalist societies tends in that direction. When it is convenient to move to another location in order to accept a new job then families are supposed to wrench themselves apart from their communities and follow instrumental, goal-rationality. When a husband and wife find that their marriage does not live up to some kind of instrumental ideal of compatibility then they are encouraged by many marriage counsellors to simply separate and divorce rather than try to examine their underlying ‘definition of the situation.’ The social construction of reality in modern capitalist societies favors instrumentalism. That is the ‘iron cage’ of goal-rational instrumentalism that Weber was concerned about. However, goal-rational social action is not the be all and end all of rationality. Hence, an ‘Exchange Theory’ or similar conceptualization of human action that takes the norms and values of modern instrumentalist societies for granted cannot be a complete explanation of human lived experience.

The challenge for those of us who have not given up on humanistic understanding of individuals but still wish to provide significant sociological generalizations will be to tackle the ideas of nineteenth and early twentieth century German philosophers and sociologists – as well as many other streams of thought – with ‘prudence’ and holistic understanding.

We are in somewhat the same position as the psychotherapist who wants to give advice about decisions in the Lebenswelt but who is not certain which values are to be accepted and which can be rejected (e.g. Lowe, 1969). Hence, we have to use Verstehen in order to really comprehend the uniquely individual situations faced by specific social actors not simply as a means of verifying generalizations (Abel, 1974). In these ‘troubled times’ issues like grief cannot be understood simply on the basis of a Behavioristic or Positivistic Research Paradigm or Theory. But how we can use Social Definitionist research and theory to better understand such unique aspects of everyday life is still not perfectly clear. There is still a considerable degree of dissonance within the ranks! As Kroker (1984) has said about the ‘Canadian Mind,’ there is a great deal of agreement but there is also a great deal of disagreement. I hope that sociologists will do more than pay lip service to the study of issues such as grief. Such issues are far too important to leave to Behaviorist psychologists (see Hudson, 1972). Whereas the Social Facts and Social Behaviorist Paradigms, in order to be ‘scientific,’ tend to view issues of individual uniqueness as secondary to theory construction in social science, the viewpoint presented here situates the paradoxical uniqueness of individuals – as understood by Weber and Schutz – at the centre of attention.

Conclusion

This essay has briefly presented some aspects of the assumptions made by Dilthey and by the Baden School. Those epistemological and ontological assumptions strongly influenced the methodological work of Weber and, indirectly, the phenomenological sociology of Schutz. (We have also touched on Simmel’s closely related intellectual contribution.) The analysis of grief and other generic social processes present interesting empirical problems that can be analyzed from a Social Definition Research Paradigm and ethnographic research on everyday life. Essentially, Dilthey’s stress on the importance of the individual Geist and the Baden School’s insistence on the importance of Cultural Sciences dealing with the historically unique and idiographic is paralleled by our Judeo-Christian-Islamic notion of the intrinsic worth of individuals and the uniqueness of an individual life. Hence, Neo-Kantian philosophical assumptions provide a secularized version of aspects of Western civilization. For Weber, although the Baden School emphasis on Kultur was crucial, it also remained important to retain awareness of the kernel of truth contained in Dilthey’s views on Geist. Weber synthesized the assumptions made by Dilthey and Windelband-Lask-Rickert.

In the study of acts, activities, meanings, relationships and settings (Lofland, 1971) we need to consider the ways in which ‘generic social processes’ are understood by actors as unique and concretely real. At the same time we also need to be open to the fact that many of the assumptions that we make are based on our own cultural baggage and that we always need to bracket the everyday world through phenomenological (including historical and comparative) awareness. That is made particularly clear when we compare Judaic-Christian-Islamic meta-paradigmatic assumptions to Hindu-Buddhist-Jain assumptions (Bakker, 1993b, 1993c).

Of course, such issues are usually considered aspects of ‘macro’ theorizing. There is no necessary reason why a sociologist could not combine macro structural issues and micro symbolic issues but the usual practice is to keep the two fairly distinct. However, since the 1980s there has been an emphasis on synthesizing macro and micro perspectives (Ritzer, 1992). One example of theoretical work that has attempted to provide a bridge between macro and micro social phenomena is Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987). A somewhat more empirical attempt is Pierre Bourdieu’s study of class in French society: Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (1984). In this paper we have not dealt with the possibility of a more comprehensive, synthetic theoretical position, but Bourdieu’s indebtedness to Weber makes it clear that he is part of the tradition that is being discussed. It would have taken us too far off topic to discuss Bourdieu’s complex theory of habitus here. Instead, the general methodological position has been discussed in a somewhat more concrete fashion by looking at work by Marris (1982) on grief and Lasch (1984) on the individual...
self. Clarification of the Neo-Kantian assumptions found in Dilthey, Rickert and Weber may help to provide possibilities for the kinds of syntheses of macro and micro approaches that Habermas and Bourdieu are developing at the cutting edge of contemporary sociological theory. Such theoretical sophistication is necessary if ethnographic research on the human lived experience is going to move from ethnocentric and ahistoric descriptions and provide more ‘generic’ generalizations.

Notes

1. The basic link is my awareness of the significance of Gandhi’s ontological, epistemological and philosophical anthropological assumptions. Gandhi had a completely different worldview than that which is characteristic of instrumental, goal-rational societies. An interesting comparison can be made between Gandhi’s Weltanschauung and Karl Marx’s Weltanschauung. One represents an extrapolation of ‘Indic civilization’ and the other represents a particular stream of thought in ‘Semitic civilization’ (i.e. the Judeo-Christian-Islamic worldview). The difference is discussed by Hans Küng.

2. I am using the term ‘ideas’ to include ‘concepts’ of all kinds, unlike Rickert, who distinguishes ideas from concepts. See Oakes (1988: 57-61, 65, 92, 104).

3. See the summary and critique by Shankman, 1984. For a somewhat different but related anthropological viewpoint see Benda-Beckmann and Strijbosch, 1986. The Dutch tradition of Sociological Anthropology as found in the work of Prof. P. de Jessen de Jonge is an interesting attempt at finding a balance between ‘thick description’ and ‘universalizing generalizations.’ There has been considerable interaction between Dutch Sociological Anthropology and French Structural Anthropology. However, we will not consider those research paradigms here.

4. The Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism is distinguished from the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, which had as its leading figures Cohen and Natorp. We will not be concerned with the Marburg School here, but its major concern was with the epistemological basis of natural sciences and it led in a positivistic direction.

5. The Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (MWG) currently consists of volumes I/2, I/3 band 1, I/3 band 2, I/4 band 1, I/4 band 2, I/10, I/15, I/16, I/17, I/19, I/5. New volumes appear regularly. The work is entirely in German, of course.

6. It is interesting to note, as Frisky (1976: xxi, footnote 35) does, that ‘the term ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ was originally introduced into German through the 1863 translation of J. S. Mill’s A System of Logic, when Schel, the translator, interpreted the title of Book VI of that work, ‘On the Logic of the Moral Sciences’ as ‘Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften oder moralischen Wissenschaften.’

7. I will reserve the term ‘methodology’ for the logic of method. When referring to specific research methods I will refer to methods and/or techniques. Most authors do not maintain this distinction but it is absolutely essential to this discussion.

8. Note that Windelband, for example, regarded his thesis concerning historical uniqueness as ultimately grounded in Christian theology, albeit in a secularized form (Oakes, 1988: 43). While distancing himself from ‘scholasticism’ (see Pieper, 1980), Windelband nevertheless recognized the significance of the Christian interpretation of the ‘Christ event.’ In Christianity, as well as in Judaism and Islam, the Creation and the Fall are unique, historical events. They occur only once. In Christianity the resurrection of Jesus Christ is also a unique, historical event. For Judaism it is the Exodus story and the role of Moses that is particularly unique. For Islam it is the revelation of Allah’s word to the Prophet Muhammad. What makes the Jewish, Christian and Islamic cultures and civilizations similar is precisely the stress on history as a unique occurrence. In the Hindu-Buddhist-Jain cultural systems there is an emphasis on recency, as manifested, for example, in reincarnation.

9. In terms of the implicit assumptions of everyday life it is interesting to note Evitair Zerubavel’s fascinating account of assumptions concerning time reckoning, particularly the artificial construction of the seven day week. There is nothing ‘natural’ about the seven day week; it is a Judeo-Christian-Islamic social construction of reality. The relativity of that conceptualization of time is clarified further when we consider the contrast with the Hindu-Buddhist Javan calendar, as still utilized in Bali (Zerubavel, 1985: 5-59; generally on illusions of certainty see Barrow, 1992: 1 – 25).

10. See the essay by Gunther Roth that is the ‘Introduction to the New Edition’ of Bendix (1977). Roth cites the contributions made to the study of Weber’s methodology by Werner Cahnman, Christian von Ferber, Dieter Lindenlaub, Hans Henrik Bruun, Thomas Burger, Gerhard Hufnagel, Fritz Loos, Alfred Schutz, and others. He also mentions Marxist and Neo-Marxist critiques of Weber’s methodology by Wolfgang Lefevre, Göran Thoburn and others. I will not attempt to summarize that literature in this article.

11. It was only after reading H. Stuart Hughes’ account in Consciousness and Society that I fully understood the radically synthetic character of Weber’s utilization of assumptions found in both Dilthey, on the one hand, and Windelband-Lask-Rickert, on the other.

12. I myself have gradually come to the conclusion that the two authors both influenced Weber and that Weber was searching for a synthesis of their views that would be relevant for his empirical work on substantive issues. The idea of syntheses is supported by H. Stuart Hughes’ analysis of the issue in Consciousness and Society.

13. Note that a more macro structural interpretation of Weber is also possible. See, for example, Bryan S. Turner’s recent work (1993). I believe that Weber’s micro interpretive and macro structuralist perspectives are part of one holistic framework. I do not accept the notion that there is a contradiction in Weber’s methodological position. However, this is not the place to argue my position on that problem. The essential key to understanding the nature of Weber’s holistic solution lies with his particular formulation of the concept of an ideal type. It would be useful to compare and contrast Weber’s concept of an ideal type with Prus’ views on ‘generic social processes.’ Are they the same?

14. Denis de Rougemont’s Love in the Western World (1983: 75-82, 102-107, 331-348, 352-362) argues, for example, that Zoroastrian Manicheanism and Arab Sufi mystical poetry influenced Catharist dualism and the courtly love songs of the troubadours. The cultivation of the idea of passionate love between a knight and a married lady is viewed by de Rougemont as a reaction to medieval orthodoxy in Roman Catholicism. All the ardour that had been directed to Heaven was now shifted to the love object. The love of a lady was viewed as the source of salvation here on earth, even if that love were not requited. Thus, for example, William IX, Count of Poitiers and Duke of Aquitaine, wrote love songs which were based on ecclesiastical forms (the conductus) and Arabic forms (the zadijat). The themes of romantic love which twelfth century troubadours sang about in France can be heard, in greatly modified form, on the radio in every industrialized country today. The major modification made since the twelfth century is, of course, the notion that passionate love can result in long-term, stable marriage or partnership. The origins of the Western conceptualization of love are traced in detail by Singer (1987).


16. However, we can only bracket that which we are aware of as an assumption. If we assume that certain aspects of ‘common sense’ are really *given* then we cannot bracket them. The rich tradition of comparative ethnographic work in anthropology is a useful supplement to ethnographic work that is done within one’s own cultural context. Thus, for example, the Anthropology of Law tradition in the Netherlands (Benda-Beckmann and Strijbosch, 1986) is a very useful source of comparative insights on norms and values, especially in terms of customary laws and mores in the diverse societies of the Indonesian archipelago. Similarly, Bateson’s anthropological contributions (e.g. Bateson, 1958) attune us to the relativity of assumptions concerning gender identity and kinship in the South Pacific.

17. I owe the idea of a ‘covertly abusive relationship’ to Adams (1991). It makes it clear that outward competence can mask inward feelings of resentment and bitterness in adults who come from homes where parents made their children unwilling partners.

18. Thus, when Schutz writes that: ‘... it is the meaning of our experience and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitute reality’ (Schutz, 1962, vol. 1: 230, cited by Goffman, 1974: 4, footnote 8) I think he is making a one-sided statement. I believe that it is both the ontological structures of objects and the epistemological meanings of subjects, taken together, which constitute ‘reality’ as we perceive and act on it. That synthetic position is found, I believe, in Weber, albeit not always consistently and not usually in a fully articulated manner. Of course, it is possible that I am simply reading into Weber a synthetic viewpoint that I, subjectively, would like to believe!

19. Grieving, like all human social action, is a process. We apply the noun ‘grief’ to the process but that may give a more rigid meaning to the actual process than is intended. There is no such ‘substance’ as grief; there is only the human activity of grieving. Weber has also made this point with reference to concepts like *Gesellschaft*. There really is no ontological reality called *Gesellschaft*; there is only *vergesellschaftung*.

20. Schutz discusses such transitional ‘shocks’ as the shock of: falling asleep [or waking up], the shock of awareness of suspending disbelief at a stage play or when hearing a joke, the visual shift in viewing a painting, the transition to a play world of toys and games, the shock of entering distinterested scientific contemplation and observation [e.g. in a field work project or in a laboratory], and even the Kierkegaardian religious ‘leap of faith.’ See Schutz (1962, vol. 1: 231, cited by Goffman, 1974: 4, footnote 7). As we become more and more aware of shifts from one phenomenological world to another we also become more adaptable. One can imagine a time when familiarity with ‘virtual reality’ machines will immunize human beings against certain kinds of shocks, just as jet travel and international tourism have already made much that was once ‘shocking’ familiar. No matter how ‘immunized’ we may become, however, it is likely that we human beings will still continue to grieve the loss of that which embodies meaning, the ‘objectified subjectivity’ of various forms of ‘love.’

21. In many versions of Buddhism and Hinduism there is much emphasis on treating not only all human beings but indeed all ‘sentient beings’ alike. Furthermore, for many Buddhists it is a truism that all sentient beings have been our ‘mothers’ in previous lives. In everyday life social action, however, that lofty ideal is usually breached. See Collins, 1982. On the tension between attachment and non-attachment to specific human beings in *bhakti* cults see Bakker, 1993a. I believe that great personal damage is done to naive people who try to practice saintly non-attachment on the basis of theological convictions that are only partially contextualized. The point is made clearly by Kornfeld (1993: 184-271).

22. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, prudence is the chief Christian virtue. In his philosophy it basically refers to what we tend to call ‘conscience.’ I am basically following Thomas Merton’s ecumenical version of Christian thinking in making this little aside!

23. As H. Stuart Hughes explains, for Weber the metaphysical philosophical problems are secondary to the meta-theoretical and methodological sociological research problems. Hence, he was able to make a pragmatic synthesis that Dilthey and Windelband-Lask-Rickert would not have been willing to make on strictly philosophical grounds.

24. See, for example, Lasch’s critique (1984: 32, 70-73) of assumptions made by Erving Goffman about identity and total institutions. The ‘presentation of self in everyday life’ that Goffman reports on may be as much a product of instrumental social action in capitalist, technologized societies, particularly the U.S., as it is a product of universal tendencies in human nature. In other words, Goffman does not carry out a cross-cultural and comparative, historical investigation of the presentation of self and may be somewhat ethnocentric about his conclusions.

25. Frans Schryer, Rilus Kinseng and I are working on a paper which will use Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* to analyze anthropological ethnographic material gathered by Kinseng in Kalimantan and by Bakker in Sulawesi. The advantage of Bourdieu’s formulation of *habitus* is that it involves a recognition of the individual’s role in the social construction of reality.

26. The recent exchange between Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls concerning the extension by Rawls of Kant’s ‘principle of autonomy’ versus Utilitarian and Value Skeptical meta- paradigmatic arguments indicates the level of discourse that I have in mind. In general the discussion of generic social processes such as ‘grief’ here is based on similar assumptions to those made by Rawls and Habermas.

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