J. Atsu Amegashie
Books and Chapters in Books
Sabotage in Contests: An Overview. To appear in the Elgar Companion to Rent-Seeking, Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman (Editors), Edward Elgar, UK.
Web-based study guide to accompany 5th edition of Microeconomics by Curtis Eaton, Diane Eaton, and Douglas Allen (Prentice Hall, Canada).
Regime Spoiler or Regime Pawn: The Military and Distributional Conflict in Non-Democracies, Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming.
Asymmetric Information and Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 25, 2014, 381- 400.
Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory and Evidence (with B. Ouattarra and E. Strobl), Economics of Governance, November 2013.
Productive versus Destructive Efforts in Contests. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 28, December 2012: 461-468.
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts (with Marco Runkel), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 56, April 2012: 313-330. See differential-game version here.
Incomplete Property Rights and Over-Investment., Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 37, June 2011: 81-95.
On Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts: An Economist's View, Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, Vol. 16: Iss. 2, 2010, Article 11.
American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol 33, November 2009: 265-277.
Self-selection, optimal income taxation, and redistribution, Journal of Economic Education, Vol 40, Winter 2009: 55-67.
Intentions, Guilt, and Social Interactions. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, and Technology (Univ. of Minnesota Law School), Vol 9: April 2008: 861-882. longer version
Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 30, May 2008: 685-699.
(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts (with Ed Kutsoati), European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 23, September 2007: 754-767. Appendices of proofs.
Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence (with Bram Cadsby and Yang Song), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 59, May 2007: 213-239 (Lead Article). Longer version with proofs, Cognitive Hierarchy solution using normalized Poisson beliefs
Sabotaging Potential Rivals (with Marco Runkel), Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 28, January 2007: 143-162.
The 2002 Winter Olympics Scandal, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 26, Jan. 2006: 183-189. Reprinted in Forty Years of Rent-Seeking Research, Volume 2, R. Congleton, A. Hillman, and K.A. Konrad (eds), Springer-Verlag, 2008.
A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter, Public Choice, Vol 126, Jan. 2006: 135-144.
Rematches in boxing and other sporting events (with Ed Kutsoati), Journal of Sports Economics, Vol 6, Nov. 2005: 401-411
A political economy model of immigration quotas, Economics of Governance, Vol 5, Nov. 2004: 255-267.
The all-pay auction when a committee awards the prize. Public Choice, Vol 116, July 2003: 79-90.
Trade liberalization and labor unions (with Toru Kikuchi).Open Economies Review, Vol 13, Jan. 2003: 5-9 (Lead Article).
Committees and rent-seeking effort under probabilistic voting. Public Choice, Vol 112, October 2002: 345-350.
An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium. Economics Letters, Vol 70, January 2001: 79-82.
Some results on rent-seeking contests with shortlisting. Public Choice, Vol. 105, Dec. 2000: 245-253.
The design of rent-seeking competitions: committees, preliminary and final contests. Public Choice, Vol. 99, April 1999: 63-76. Corrigendum
The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures: an unpleasant result. Public Choice, Vol. 99, April 1999: 57-62.
How unpleasant a result? A reply to Derek J. Clark. Public Choice, Vol. 102, March 2000: 369-372.
See Professor Clark's comment.
The Economics of Subsidies, Crossroads, Vol 6, 2006: 7-15; and African Agenda, Vol 8, no.3, 2005.
Fiscal Transparency, Accountability, and Taxation.
Consumers' Complaints, the Nature of Corruption, and Social Welfare
A Nested Contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction.
Work in progress
On the relationship between average cost and efficiency
Self-selection in competing all-pay auctions (with Ximing Wu).
A Positive Theory of Immutable Characteristics and Discrimination.
Economics, Gratitude, and Warm-Glow.
Burning out in sequential elimination contests.
Terror alerts and beliefs about terrorism (with Ed Kutsoati)
Misery loves company: social influence and the supply/pricing decision of popular night clubs.
Negative externalities and the private provision of public goods: a survey.
Asymmetry and collusion in infinitely repeated contests.
Mortgages . (Pedagogy)
Leadership, information, and Poverty Traps: Rationalizing Social Equilibria
To reduce poverty, let's measure it properly
A Remark on Nozick's Libertarianism
There are no bills left on the sidewalk?
Why the 'right' institutions might fail
What is Exploitation?