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Curriculum Vitae

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

My areas of interest are Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics, and Experimental Economics.

Recently, my main research focus is on voting and legislative bargaining.

Publications

Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation” (with François Maniquet), Economics Letters 125(1) (2014)25-28. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011. (PDF)

Inefficient Committees: Small Elections with Three Alternatives”, Social Choice and Welfare 43(2) (2014): 357-375. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0784-5. (PDF)

"On the Informational Efficiency of Simple Scoring Rules" (with François Maniquet), Journal of Economic Theory 146 (4) (2011): 1464-1480. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001. (PDF)

Omnibus or Not: Package Bills and Single-Issue Bills in a Legislative Bargaining Game”, Social Choice and Welfare 36 (3-4) (2011): 547-563. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0508-z. (PDF)

Market Composition and Experience in Common-Value Auctions”, Experimental Economics 15 (1) (2012): 106-147. The final publication is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9291-7. (PDF)

Working Papers

“Large Elections with Multiple Alternatives: A Condorcet Jury Theorem and Inefficient Equilibria” (with Francois Maniquet), CORE Discussion Paper 2013/23 PDF. [Notice that this version is significantly different from the one published in Economics Letters. They present distinct sets of results.]

“On the Informational Efficiency of Simple Scoring Rules” (with Francois Maniquet), CORE Discussion Paper 2009/26 PDF. [Notice that this version is significantly different from the one published in Journal of Economic Theory. They present distinct sets of results.]

Other Work in Progress

“Level-K Reasoning in Elections” (with Francois Maniquet).

“Voting in Small Elections with Common Preferences: An Experimental Study” (with Kirill Chernomaz).

“Approval Voting in Juries, Theoretical and Experimental”.

“Information Acquisition in Large Three-Candidate Elections with Approval Voting”.

"Approval Voting under Proportional Representation" (with François Maniquet).

“Comparison of Legislative Bargaining Rules and Their Influence on Income Redistribution in Systems with Proportional Representation and Majority Rule” (with François Maniquet).

“Multi-Issue Legislative Bargaining: An Experimental Study on Alternating Offers and Demands with Multiple Policies”.

“Information Acquisition in Large Three-Candidate Elections with Approval Voting”.

"Approval Voting under Proportional Representation" (with Francois Maniquet).

“Comparison of Legislative Bargaining Rules and Their Influence on Income Redistribution in Systems with Proportional Representation and Majority Rule” (with François Maniquet).

“Multi-Issue Legislative Bargaining: An Experimental Study on Alternating Offers and Demans with Multiple Policies".