

Grad Colloquium III Abstracts:

"Hegel and Deleuze on Images"

Daniel Griffin

For most modern philosophers, the concept of the image plays merely a derivative or ancillary role in the philosophy of mind. So-called “mental images” are thought to be derivative of and secondary to our immediate, intuitive experiences. Moreover, images inherently misrepresent, confuse, and abstract from the concrete content of our intuitions. Our everyday use of “image” reflects a similar ontological and epistemological sense of the term. Images are, for this modern tradition, fundamentally representational. Hegel and Deleuze are two philosophers who buck this trend. In this paper, I argue they present two convincing, albeit different accounts of images as fundamentally non-representational. I first trace Hegel’s account of the concept of the image in his *Philosophy of Mind*, showing how the creation of images forms a necessary condition for the representation and recognition of objects of our intuitive experience. I then examine Deleuze’s multifarious concept of image, which exploits three different senses of “image”: a dominant “image of thought,” different “images of philosophers,” and a variety of cinematographic images. I argue that Deleuze’s account goes further than Hegel’s by showing how images are constitutive of thought as such, either as constraints or boons to thought. These two accounts should prompt us to reevaluate both the traditional account of images as representational and the constitutive role of images in shaping our own subjectivity and acts of thinking.

"Unity beyond reconciliation: Husserl’s investigation of the foundationalism in *Logical Investigations*"

Vedran Grahovac

Husserl is decisive, in the Third Logical Investigation, that the whole cannot be a simple collection or a combination of its parts. The unity of related terms is expressed through the changes in the way in which parts relate to each other through their mutual participation in their essences. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is ‘accumulated’ in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where the ‘term in relation’ conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. Furthermore, the phenomenological-analytic force, which is released through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is proportional to the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled through the process of their unification. I will expand upon this analysis by focusing on the mutuality through the self-enclosure between the act-matter and the act-quality in Husserl’s reflections upon the intentional essence in the Fifth Logical Investigation.