

PHIL 3180: PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: *"The Hard Problem", & Questions Concerning the Naturalization of Phenomenology (or: Zombies, & the Annihilation of the World)*
MEETING: TUESDAYS & THURSDAYS, 11:30am - 1:00pm
ROOM: MACK 225

INSTRUCTOR: Luke Fraser

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WEBSITE: <http://courselink.uoguelph.ca>

(Several of the course readings will be made available on the courselink site, in PDF form. We will also be making use of the "discussion board" feature on the site, so please log in frequently.)

OVERVIEW OF THE COURSE:

In this course, we will be taking up a series of problems bearing on the relation between consciousness and physical reality (nature) -- problems which David Chalmers has loosely gathered together under the rubric of "the hard problem" in the philosophy of mind. We will, to a large extent, frame these problems in the context of the contemporary research programme of *naturalizing phenomenology*. Phenomenology, broadly speaking, aspires to be a scientific account of consciousness as such, an analysis of the structure of consciousness carried out independently of any reference to nature (to the brain, to causation, etc.). It aims to secure this independence by means of the "phenomenological reduction", which puts out of play the commitments and presuppositions of "the natural attitude"—roughly, the spontaneous supposition of a "real world" in which we go about our business.

To "naturalize" a theoretical domain, by contrast, means to explain its contents without recourse to anything beyond the collective domains of the empirical sciences (physics, biology, etc.). (A "naturalist" theory of mind, for example, would be one which attempts to explain mental processes solely in terms of neurobiological processes.) Much of the philosophical interest in the project of "naturalizing phenomenology" arises from the apparent paradox involved in attempting to synthesize what seem to be two diametrically opposed approaches to the problem of consciousness, each operating under quite distinct ideas of what it is to produce a scientific account of an object. However, without an adequate phenomenological analysis of consciousness -- a detailed, structural account of conscious processes as they appear -- it would remain altogether unclear what it is that we hope to "explain" by means of a naturalistic theory of mind. To give up, in principle, on the possibility of "naturalizing" the domain of phenomenology, moreover, would seem to mean giving up on the very idea of naturalism. How, then, should we understand the apparent, but vague, correlations between neurological and mental processes that the best research in neuroscience has so far claimed to uncover?

Some related questions that we will be addressing in this course will be: Can consciousness be adequately explained in terms of physical and neurobiological processes? Should an adequate theoretical description of consciousness be "reducible" to a neuroscientific account of brain (or bodily) processes? Or is it rather on the basis of a science of consciousness, which would include a science of experience and reasoning in general, that we should attempt to ground any theory of the natural world, including neuroscience? Can the naturalization project be made compatible with phenomenology's claim to being a transcendental science? Can we consistently shift from naturalistic to transcendental accounts by means of a mere "change of attitude", as Husserl suggests? Can neuroscientific findings challenge, correct or guide phenomenological analyses (or vice versa)? Can a synthesis of neuroscientific and phenomenological findings take place without a

thorough reworking of the very concepts of consciousness and natural reality? Is it even possible to produce a scientific account of consciousness that is, at once, both *unified* and *adequate* -- ideals to which both naturalism and phenomenology aspire? Or is consciousness condemned, *in principle*, to remain a thing of mystery, and never an object of science?

REQUIRED TEXTS:

Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science*, (London: Routledge, 2008).

Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999).

Jean Petitot et al., eds., *Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

RECOMMENDED TEXTS:

Thomas Metzinger, *The Ego Tunnel*, (New York: Basic Books, 2009).

Criteria of Evaluation	
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Pop Quizzes	20%
Presentation <i>or</i> Midterm Report	30%
Term Paper <i>and</i> Proposal	40%
Participation	10%

Pop Quizzes: Each week, there will be a 1 in 3 chance that you will be required to write, at the beginning of class, *one page* on the reading for that week. This should include (1) a gloss on one or more significant points in the text, and (2) at least one thoughtful question or critique pertaining to the material. You will have **10 minutes** to write each quiz. Quizzes will be marked out of 5, and will be averaged together to obtain the 20% mark. You may bring in *one page* of notes to work from, but the quiz itself must be written on the spot. **Quizzes must be completed in seminar, and will not be accepted after the seminar in which they are given.**

Presentation OR Midterm Report: You have two options, here: You may either prepare and deliver a brief (10 minutes ≈ 5-6 pp) presentation to the class at some point over the course of the semester, **or** prepare a short paper (10 pp), which will be due at the end of Week VII. The object of this assignment, in either case, will be *to focus narrowly* on a concept, thesis, problem, case study or phenomenon discussed in one of the readings (if you are doing a presentation, the text you use should be one read in the week in which you are scheduled to present), and to do some original philosophical work on it. This could involve:

- Reconstructing a clear definition for a significant concept that is not clearly defined in the text.
- Challenging a phenomenological analysis of a particular phenomenon, or kind of phenomenon, perhaps by calling attention to salient features of the phenomenon overlooked or mischaracterized by the analyst.
- Calling attention to a significant problem that is inherent in the text, but which does not receive an adequate resolution (or perhaps even adequate notice), and explaining why this is problem needs to be reckoned with.
- Developing a careful and rigorous argument *either for or against* a thesis advanced in the text.

- Showing how and why a particular psychological/neurological *case study*—taken either from the text in question, or from elsewhere—might have significant consequences for our understanding of subjectivity, temporality, experience, cognition, intentionality, or any other theme dealt with in this course.

Whichever option you choose—paper or presentation—you will also be assigned to act as a **respondent** to one of the presentations. You will be expected to attend the presentation, and to have prepared **one or two brief but thoughtful questions** to put to the presenter after her presentation (it shouldn't take more than, say, a minute or two to pose the question, but the respondent should be ready to frame his or her question with more than just a sentence or two). Presenters should correspond with their respondents prior to the date of the presentation, so that the respondent(s) can be made aware of the precise topic of the presentation.

Term Paper Proposal: By the end of Week IX, you will be asked to submit a 1-2pp proposal outlining your term paper topic. This should include: (1) A clear statement of the problem you wish to elucidate and possibly solve, or the thesis you plan to defend; (2) a short explanation of why this problem/thesis is interesting; (3) a sketch of the main parts of the paper in which you plan to do this (outlining the anticipated steps of your argument, etc.); (4) a projected bibliography (which shouldn't be terribly long -- one or two primary texts, and couple of auxiliary or secondary texts is plenty).

Term Paper: Your term paper will be between 12 and 20 pages in length. In it, you will formulate an original problem and work towards its solution as thoroughly as possible. The paper may be exegetical or historical *in part* (you can spend up to one half of the paper doing this sort of thing), but must develop an original argument. (This argument may take the form of a textual critique, the reasoned advancement of an original thesis, an interesting phenomenological analysis (which is *not* a license for autobiographical meanderings or vague introspections -- genuinely phenomenological descriptions aim to articulate invariant structures of experience which could, in principle, be universalizable), an elaboration of the philosophical implications of neurological findings or concrete case studies, etc.) Your term paper will be graded with the following criteria in mind:

- Originality
- Focus
- Philosophical rigour (argumentative force, logical consistency, conceptual precision, descriptive accuracy, etc.)
- Stylistic clarity and organizational structure
- Evidence of having understood the material

Term papers will be due ***one week after the final seminar.***

Participation: You will be expected to come to each seminar prepared to discuss the week's reading, and to make an effort to contribute to discussions and debates during the class.

PENALTIES FOR LATENESS: 2% per day late. Weekends count as one day (i.e. if an assignment is due on Friday, and you hand it in on Monday, it is marked down by 2%, not by 6%).

Term papers will not be accepted if they are more than ONE WEEK late
(unless they are accompanied by a doctor's note, obituary, or a document of comparable gravity and authenticity).

READING SCHEDULE

WEEK	DATE	READINGS	NOTIFICATIONS	PRESENTATIONS
I	Thursday, Sept. 9 th	[No readings]	Syllabus distributed. Presentations scheduled.	No presentations
II	Tuesday, Sept. 14 th	Thomas NAGEL, "What is it like to be a bat?" <i>The Philosophical Review</i> , vol. 83 n° 4: pp. 435-450 (PDF) [15 pp]		No presentations
	Wednesday, Sept. 15 th	3:30 _{pm} in MACK Rm # 313: Phil. Dept. Guest Speaker: Uriah KRIEGEL gives a paper titled, "Cognitive Phenomenology: From Analysis to Argument." Try to be there!	Participation marks will be given to those attending KRIEGEL'S talk.	
	Thursday, Sept. 16 th	David CHALMERS, "Facing up to the problem of consciousness." (PDF) [25 pp]		
III	Tuesday, Sept. 21 st	Edmund HUSSERL, <i>Cartesian Meditations</i> , First Meditation (§§3-11) [20 pp]		
	Thursday, Sept. 23 rd	HUSSERL, <i>Cartesian Meditations</i> , Second Meditation (§§12-19) [20 pp]		
IV	Tuesday, Sept. 28 th	HUSSERL, <i>Cartesian Meditations</i> , Second Meditation (§§20-22) + Fourth Meditation (§§30-33; §§40-41) [20 pp]		
	Thursday, Sept. 30 th	HUSSERL, Selections from <i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy</i> (§§47-52). ("The Annihilation of the World") (PDF) [19 pp] <i>Recommended: Paul RICOEUR, Selections from Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, pp. 16-20; 24-28. (PDF)</i>		
V	Tuesday, Oct. 5 th	ZAHAVI & GALLAGHER, <i>The Phenomenological Mind</i> , Ch.2: "Methodologies," pp. 13-41 [28 pp]	Term paper assigned , with explanatory handout.	
	Thursday, Oct. 7 th	ZAHAVI & GALLAGHER, <i>The Phenomenological Mind</i> , Ch.3: "Consciousness & Self-Consciousness," pp. 45-66 [21 pp]	Guest lecture: Michael Braund.	
VI	Tuesday, Oct. 12 th	ZAHAVI & GALLAGHER, <i>The Phenomenological Mind</i> , Ch.6: "Intentionality" (pp. 107-126) [19 pp]		
	Thursday, Oct. 14 th	D.W. SMITH, "Intentionality Naturalized?" in <i>Naturalizing Phenomenology</i> . [27 pp]		
VII	Tuesday, Oct. 19 th	Paul CHURCHLAND, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> , vol. 78, n° 2: pp. 67-90. (PDF) [23 pp]		

	Thursday, Oct. 21 st	Wilfrid SELLARS, <i>Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind</i> , §§1-19. (PDF) [17 pp]	Midterm papers due.	
VIII	Tuesday, Oct. 26 th	SELLARS, <i>Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind</i> , §§20-23, §§30-44. (PDF) [20 pp]		
	Thursday, Oct. 28 th	Wilfrid SELLARS, <i>Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind</i> , §§44-63. (PDF) [22 pp]		
IX	Tuesday, Nov. 2 nd	Thomas METZINGER, "Phenomenal Transparency & Cognitive Self-Reference," pp. 353-375 (PDF) [22 pp]		
	Thursday, Nov. 4 th	METZINGER, "Phenomenal Transparency..." pp. 375-387. (PDF) [12 pp]	Term paper proposals due.	
X	Tuesday, Nov. 9 th	Francisco VARELA, "The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness," in <i>Naturalizing Phenomenology</i> , pp. 266-288 (§§1-6) [21 pp]		
		<i>Recommended reading: Zahavi & Gallagher, The Phenomenological Mind, Ch.4: "Time"</i>		
	Thursday, Nov. 11 th	VARELA, "The Specious Present..." pp. 288-306 (§§6-8) [18 pp]		
XI	Tuesday, Nov. 16 th	METZINGER, "Neurophenomenological Case Studies II," in <i>Being No One</i> , pp. 461-488 [27 pp]	Guest Lecture by Michal Arciszewski.	No presentations
	Thursday, Nov. 18 th	METZINGER, "Neurophenomenological Case Studies II," pp. 488-521 [33 pp] (many pages, but many pictures)		No presentations
XII	Tuesday, Nov. 23 rd	Natalie DEPRAZ, "When Transcendental Genesis Encounters the Naturalization Project," in <i>Naturalizing Phenomenology</i> , pp. 464-483 [19 pp]		
	Thursday, Nov. 25 th	Jeff MITSCHERLING, <i>Aesthetic Genesis</i> , Chapter 5, pp. 99-116 (PDF) [17 pp]		
XIII	Tuesday, Nov. 30 th	Catherine MALABOU, [TBA (≤20pp)]	Guest Lecture by Ryan Krahn	No presentations
	Thursday, Dec. 2 nd	Jeff MITSCHERLING, <i>Aesthetic Genesis</i> , Chapter 6, pp. 121-142 (PDF) [21 pp]	Final Seminar.	
—	Thursday, Dec. 9 th	— NO SEMINARS —	TERM PAPERS DUE	
	Thursday, Dec. 16th	— NO SEMINARS —	FINAL DEADLINE FOR ALL ASSIGNMENTS. NOTHING WILL BE ACCEPTED PAST THIS POINT.	

SEVEN STANDARD STATEMENTS

E-mail Communication

As per university regulations, all students are required to check their <uoguelph.ca> e-mail account regularly: e-mail is the official route of communication between the university and its students.

When You Cannot Meet a Course Requirement...

When you find yourself unable to meet an in-course requirement because of illness or compassionate reasons, please advise the course instructor (or designated person, such as a teaching assistant) in writing, with your name, id#, and e-mail contact. See the undergraduate calendar for information on regulations and procedures for Academic Consideration:
<http://www.uoguelph.ca/registrar/calendars/undergraduate/current/c08/c08-ac.shtml>

Drop Date

The last date to drop one-semester Fall 2010 courses, without academic penalty, is **Thursday November 4**. For regulations and procedures for Dropping Courses, see the Undergraduate Calendar: <http://www.uoguelph.ca/registrar/calendars/undergraduate/current/c08/c08-drop.shtml>

Copies of out-of-class assignments

Keep paper and/or other reliable back-up copies of all out-of-class assignments: you may be asked to resubmit work at any time.

Academic Misconduct

The University of Guelph is committed to upholding the highest standards of academic integrity and enjoins all members of the University community – faculty, staff, and students – to be aware of what constitutes academic misconduct and to do as much as possible to prevent academic offences from occurring. The Academic Misconduct Policy is detailed in the Undergraduate Calendar:
<http://www.uoguelph.ca/registrar/calendars/undergraduate/current/c08/c08-amisconduct.shtml>

Recording of Materials

Presentations which are made in relation to course work—including lectures—cannot be recorded in any electronic media without the permission of the presenter, whether the instructor, a classmate or guest lecturer.

Resources

The Undergraduate Calendar is the source of information about the University of Guelph's procedures, policies and regulations which apply to undergraduate programs. It can be found at:
<http://www.uoguelph.ca/registrar/calendars/undergraduate/current/>