FARE-talk is to provide an enduring conversation about contemporary topics relevant to food, agricultural, and resource economics.
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[0:05] Brady: Welcome to FARE talk, where we set out to provide enduring discussions on contemporary topics relevant to our economy, with particular emphasis on food, agriculture, and the environment. My name is Brady Deaton Jr., of the Department of Food, Agriculture and Resource Economics at the University of Guelph. I'll be your host.
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Brady: Today, Barry Goodwin and I will be discussing his research on the effect of US government subsidies on US farmland values and rental rates. Barry is William Neal Reynolds professor in the departments of economics and agriculture and resource economics at North Carolina State University. Barry, welcome to FARE Talk.
Barry: Thank you Brady. Good to be hear.
[0:45] Brady: I should note to listeners that today's discussion will orbit around a paper that Barry and his colleagues have written, and the title of that paper is The Buck Stops Where? The Distribution of Agriculture Subsidies, and a link to that paper will be made available. Barry, I love the way you start this paper, and I'm just going to throw the question that you pose to your readers, a question that you took from a news report, and I think it's an interesting way to start this podcast. And the question is, what do former basketball star Scottie Pippen, publisher Larry Flynt and stockbroker Charles Schwab all have in common? And what's the answer to that question, and why is it important?
Barry: Well they're all beneficiaries of farm program subsidy payments, so, and they're not, you know, individuals that we would associate as being involved in production agriculture. You know, makes for an interesting news story, to find these different individuals that are very wealthy and very influential, and yet are receiving farm subsidy payment cheques.
[1:55] Brady: And somewhat related to this, is I was looking at Paul Barkley's centennial history of the American agriculture economics association, and he's talking about four running meetings that four runners of the association, in particular looking at the economics society, and he talks about a session that was put together to examine the rapid increase of the system of land renting, the absorption of small holdings by wealthy land owners, and the abandonment of farms. But what's interesting about that is that it was a session that was put together in 1897 [laughs].
Barry: Wow, that's fascinating, yea. I have seen that but it’s, I Believe the farm ownership peaked at some point there back in the early part of the last century, so the number of farmers and that sort of thing has been sort of on the downward trend ever since, so.
Brady: Now the numbers, one aspect of this question is, it turns out that a great portion of farm land in the US and I believe the phenomenon is relatively similar in Canada, is owned by people that wouldn’t be considered farmers, or non-operators.
Barry: Yea, that's right. I mean it's, and even more fundamental to that is the fact that such a high proportion of farm land is operated by a tenant not the owner, and you know, I think in the US now it's approximately 40%, but if you go into some of the main production areas like the middle of the corn belt, I think it goes even much higher. So, it's, you know, an increasingly prominent feature of agriculture in developed countries, in the US, I know it is very similar in Canada. And so, there's that part of it, and then there's the question, well who are these landlords? Are they other farmers? Or I think what we generally think of, you know, sort of think of a anecdotal story that you might be familiar with, it's some retired farmer that's living in the area and renting out their land to their neighbours, but USDA did look at this back, I believe it was about 98 or 99 in one of their land owner surveys, and the found, you know, some really interesting findings that a lot of landlords are retired farmers, but an awful lot of them don't live near the farm, they're not retired farmers, they're you know, retaining ownership of this land that may have been in the family, but they are not involved in production agriculture to any tangible extent at all. So, you know, some very interesting questions.
[4:34] Brady: We did a survey actually in southern Ontario trying to figure out that question to, and we found very similar results. Clearly widows and widowers are, that's a big category, and retired farmers. But there's a lot of people, particularly in southern Ontario that are what are identified as residential land owners that may live on the land, but aren't kind of actively farming, and maybe commuting to another job.
Barry: Exactly, yea.
Brady: So this is a big question, and, you know, there can be pros and cons, I guess, in a variety of ways, but you are really looking at the transmission of the agriculture subsidies to the land owner as well as the tenant. And, I guess, talk to me a little bit about what the debate is, or what the kind of thinking, the general thinking of that, and then we will kind of go over maybe some of your general results and then move into the more specifics of your paper. But what would be the expectation of how that would play itself out?
Barry: Yea, so, you know, just to start with, land value, like any other asset, land arises value from the stream of incomes that it is going to earn in the future, and there is some uncertainty associated with those incomes and one thing we do look at in this paper and some others that we've done is really just to consider the fact that different sources, different policies, different types of income may have a, you know, different degrees of uncertainty associated with it, so how they're going impact asset values could differ as a result of that, but you know, the big concern right now, whether it’s a concern or just a, you know, a feature of agriculture, is the fact that high prices have driven up land values tremendously. You know, it’s just been in the last five to ten years we've seen just a real increase in land values, and that's of course, a capital gain to the land owners, it's, you know, a cost to somebody who's wanting to get started in agriculture and acquire this land, but there's a lot of issues that relate to the fact that these assets have continued to gain value. And then there's also the question of who are these policies really intended to provide benefits to? The legislation requires, in the US, that if it's a cash lease, that the subsidy cheque goes to the operator, the tenant if it’s a tenant operator, and because they're technically the ones who are holding all of the production risk, that's the way it’s always done and has been done. And, if it’s a share lease, which is becoming less common in most areas in the US, but if it’s a share lease, then the subsidy cheques would be divided according to the terms of the share. But, you know, one important question is, if the cheques, the cash leases, which are the most prominent way land is leased, if the cheque is going to the tenant, does that mean that the landlord is not benefitting from that? And the fact that so many landlords really are quite far removed from production agriculture now, is that the intent of the policy? Or is that just, you know, a consequence of the way the policies are distributed? It's an important question as to really, if it’s a cash lease sort of arrangement, does the landlord essentially raise lease rates to capture some of those additional benefits when policies change. And we believe we do, and I think the literature is pretty clear on that. The debate is over how much of that dollar of subsidies stays with the operator and how much goes back to the landlord.
[8:28] Brady: Right. So, the land owner is sitting there, and they become aware of a government subsidy that is going to the tenant. I guess the question is, do they capture that full subsidy or to what extent is it shared? And you kind of, your research focuses not only, in this paper, on the total effect of say government subsidies on farm land values and rental rates, but also you’re able to break apart the different ag programs and see if there's differences in these ag programs on how they affect rental rates and land values. I think that's pretty interesting.
Barry: Yea, and again, that goes back to, and we have another paper back in, oh I can't remember, 2003. [Brady: 2003, I think. Yea, the H.A., yea] Yea, looking at the, really how we've modelled these, you know, land value determinants and that sort of thing. And what we look at there is the fact that, it’s several different things. but different sources of income, if they have different risk associated with it, and certainly policy carries its own risk in terms of whether it will be eliminated, I think, you know, we've seen some pretty big adjustments to the fact that direct payments are gonna, very likely be eliminated if we ever do get a new farm bill in the US. But if something is very uncertain, and the operator is risk averse, then they're going to discount that, value of that, going into the future with a higher discounting rate, and it’s going to have less of an impact on land values. What we've looked at is the fact that if you don’t recognize that your models of land value, and the degree that benefits are capitalized into asset values are really going to be flawed, you know, because different policies will have different effects, essentially, so.
[10:32] Brady: You emphasize in your paper, over and over again, that these land values, for example, are based upon these expectations, and these expectations may vary, not along across what the market returns are, but also with respect to this sort of different portfolio government payments that come in. So, what, in general, what would you say is your big finding, and then maybe we will step back and talk about some of the particular aspects of the study.
Barry: Yea, well, one issue related to this, that you mentioned, pertaining to expectations, and again, it goes back, somewhat, to this earlier paper, but there' another econometrics type problem that arises that really just has to do with the nature of the data and the fact that it tends to be very systemically correlated in, across a lot of farms in a given year. So, the implication is, you know, you'd like to say “Well I'll look at what my payments were last year, and that's going to give me a good idea of what they're going to be next year, and the year after, and the year after,” and that might work very well for something like direct payments, that are pretty much set for a certain period time. But if you are talking about returns from disaster payments or, you know, price support systems sort, especially ad hoc support, that's not part of the standing legislation, you know, what you actually observe in one year, or another year, or the past five years, may not be a very good representation of what you'd expect to see over the long run. So, it’s another issue that I think, you know, causes us to take another careful look at the way land values have typically been modeled in the past. So, I think that's one thing that the paper brings out, probably more so in the earlier work that I mentioned. I guess the real point of controversy with this paper relative to some of the others, has to do with how, in a cash lease arrangement, how a payment is actually shared between a landlord and their tenant, and it goes of course to the tenant in a cash lease, but then the landlord extracts a portion of that back in terms of a higher lease rate, and those adjustments take place over time, and you know, it’s a moving target for the producers and the landlords and that sort of thing, but I do know, from some of the work I've done with outreach, that farmers have, you know, felt these pressures from landlords, especially when policies change quite a bit. In 2002, we got, I was up at Ohio State at that time, but we got a lot of calls from growers and they were, you know, having to renegotiate their lease contracts. So, other work has found that, I think we find anywhere from a 39 or 35 cents goes to landlord, or stays with the tenant rather, or no, goes to the landlord, I had it right the first time, about 35 to 60, 50, 60 cents, something like that, and it just varies across the polices of course. But other works found that landlords get a much smaller amount of that. And some fine work that Barrett Kirwen did that came to different conclusions, but you know, it’s an empirical question and I think it just depends upon who you are looking at and what the market characteristics are at that point in time, so.
[14:13] Brady: Alright, well let me ask, we had Barrett on an early podcast, we were talking about his estimates that the landlord, you know, would get, I forget, somewhere 20 to 25 cents, let’s say, and so that would mean that the tenant was getting a substantial portion of the government dollar, let’s say that marginal dollar paid by the government. And you find a much higher, I think in general though, you have like you mentioned you have a lot of sensitivity analysis, but you find a much higher return to the land owner, which implies then, that as you suggested, that the tenant is getting less of that. So if the tenant, I mean to me, the magnitudes are really important here, right, because if the tenant isn't getting, if the intention is to help the producer, or who is let’s say, a tenant, and the entire subsidy is being passed to the land owner, or most of it, then that has a very different policy implication, than I guess one in which they are getting the majority of the subsidy. Do you lean towards it being, you know, you know, closer to the majority, or how do you lean in terms of the magnitude? I know Barrett’s, yea...
Barry: Yea, I mean I think, you know, I think, of course I would feel like our estimates are close, just you know, we can't set our biases [Brady: Sure] completely aside on things, but a bigger issue, and taking a step back for a second, I think that as economists, as empirical economists, we really don't have still a real good handle, we know anecdotally how these markets are functioning, but we don't have a really good handle on, you know, exactly what these land transactions entail, because there’s tradition involved, there's social linkages, there's, you know, proximity considerations, there's all sorts of arrangements that exist there, and we would like to say, “You know, this is a perfectly competitive market,” or “one side or the other has the advantage,” and I think its probably just a mix of all of those things. It's far from being a perfectly competitive market, because I think, you know, these things are negotiated by a small group of players. So there’s probably some game that would represent this in some way, but I'm not sure you could apply it to every single circumstance. So, I think that's one reason you could see differences [Brady: Mhmm] in some of the results. The period of study has a lot to do with it to, and it goes back to this question of what are the policies, and you know, one thing that really I think we have a difference of opinion on, on some of the research, is some of the assumptions about what the 1996 F.A.I.R. Act in the US really signified and meant, and what the policy environment was at the time, and you know, thinking back, it was a nice time to talk about cutting the support because prices were strong and, you know, the fixed payments were, seemed like sort of a temporary measure to gradually get the government out of agriculture, but we all know what happened, just, you know, a year or two later when the Asian financial crisis sort of tipped markets in a way that caused prices to fall, and congress was very, very quick to jump in with support, price supports, and it’s also the case that direct payments were not the only thing going on right then, there was a whole other range of policies. The F.A.I.R. Act didn't eliminate price supports completely, and so, you know, to say that this represented some sort of natural experiment I don’t really agree with that because I think the conditions were such that it made the policy change endogenous to what the market situation was, and what the political situation was. So, I wouldn’t characterize it as an exogenous shock to markets, and I don’t believe farmers for a minute thought that the government wasn't going to jump in if things turned south for them, as they did, and as they typically do, and as congresses always been a, you know, quite willing to do to get out the cheque books. So, that's one of the important distinctions. That's a very long winded answer, but [Brady: Yea, no, no, no] you know, I think, you know, my challenge to some of the younger researchers out there is, you know, help us figure out these contracts and these rental arrangements, because they are very sophisticated, they involve a lot of cost sharing, they're generally hybrids now between cash and share leases, and you know, a perfectly competitive land market really doesn't fit the local situation where these exchanges take place.
[19:26] Brady: I think that’s, you know, that's really one of the great things about, you know, the profession of applied economics of agriculture economics, that there can be general agreement on the, you know, on the theory but there's a lot of importance to playing these, getting these magnitudes right. I mean the difference between the majority of it going to a land owner, if that’s not the intention of policy, versus the majority going to a tenant, have a lot, you know, have a potentially, in the long run, a lot of implications for how we perceive and support ag policy. On this idea of expectations, one thing that I find just terribly fascinating about your paper, and also builds on what you just mentioned about what people thought at a given time was going to happen to government, is it you who find that the marginal contribution of a dollar to farmland values is greater than the marginal contribution of say, an increase dollar in the market return, in the returns to the market to farmland values. And at first blush, that seems surprising, but when you get into this notion of expectations, its, it kind of makes sense. Can you talk about that finding a little bit?
Barry: Yea, I mean, I find it still surprising a bit, and you know, like an empirical research, there's some, the results are driven by the data and the analysis that was done, and the assumptions, and so, you know, to be very clear about that, I would have expected a bigger role for the market. But there is an awful lot of uncertainty associated with, especially looking over this period of time, when these data were collected, associated with the stream of income that comes from the marketplace. You know, the median farm in the US and a lot of this has to do with how you define a farm, but I think there adjusted gross revenue each is about negative $15,000 a year or so. It’s, you know, a lot of farms operate with a negative margin, and there's good reasons for that having to do with the policies, and again how farms are defined and taxed, tax allowances and some of the special accounting privileges that farmers get. But, you know, if you look back in time, things have been a little different since '07 or so, but you look back, yea there has been a lot of uncertainty associated with market earnings, and maybe less so when you compare it to something like a direct payment or even a loan deficiency payment that puts a floor under prices.
[22:13] Brady: I mean, I've found the idea fairly compelling, at least abstractly, that if you’re looking at government payments at any, at the point that your data is examined, actually, let's go what years are we examining again?
Barry: You know I had to look at the paper, we have looked at this over [Brady: Uh huh] you know, several different periods. I believe here we are looking at from 96 forward on into the, you know, I think 2002 was where our data stopped at actually.
Brady: Okay, yea. Alright, so over that period, the expected volatility and market returns could have, you know, been much, much higher than the expected, you know, volatility in government payments is that...
Barry: Yea, I think so, yea. That's it exactly and, you know, there's some diagram in the paper that sort of show some of this volatility that, you know, looking at various levels of aggregation. And, you know, this volatility of course as you get closer and closer to the farm level goes up quite a bit because of the idiosyncrasies associated with individual farm earnings. So, I, you know, it’s surprising but I think there's an explanation for it, yet as well, so. And another issue here of course is trying to extend these research results into what markets are like today, cause I’ve just saw today that farm earnings are supposed to be up, net farm earnings in the US, thirteen percent over last year, and that's, you know, last year was a good year, in spite of the drought, so, things are quite different the last few years.
[23:58] Brady: When you think about the different kind of payments, and you kind of, I should just mention too, we'll have links to this paper, one of the really interesting things of the paper is, it goes into a fair amount of detail of the various government programs that it’s trying to model. And then, you know, you do find differences in the return, the effect, of the different programs on rental rates and farm land values. Can you maybe just take, you talked about a distinction between farm programs that have an insurance component into them, and how those like counter-cyclical payments, [Barry: Mhmm] and how those have affected farmlands values versus, let’s say a direct payment that may not be tied to market conditions so much.
Barry: Sure. I mean it’s really, it’s simple as sort of a wealth effect versus an insurance type effect, and if you have risk averse growers, you know, they're gonna value policies that serve to reduce volatility in the market, and volatility of their earnings, you know, just on the shear fact that they characteristic, and even if they're not necessarily increasing incomes. So, you know, there’s, we've grown fond over the past several years of trying to break policies down into wealth and insurance effects and these different things. I think, I think there's a lot to be said for that, I don’t agree with how some of the, some of the characterizations are made some times, but you know, clearly direct payments, fixed direct payments or direct wealth transfer to growers, there shouldn’t be any uncertainty associated with that. Things like price supports and market loss adjustment payments, very, very different type of policy entirely, so. And if you want to understand how, you know how producers are viewing a dollar, a dollar back in policy benefits you have to really consider what type of program that policy benefit came through.
[26:11] Brady: So in terms of the effect, the direct payment had a higher basically, or a lower effect than the ones that were kind of counter-cyclical payments, or..?
Barry: Yea, I believe it, there's less uncertainty associated with, you know, a direct payment, it’s pretty much guaranteed over the life of the legislation, and then in fact, you know, one very interesting question that’s sort of sitting there and needing discussion whenever we think about these things, is really did farmers truly believe that fixed direct payments were going to go down until they went to zero in 2002? And, you know Congress, you know, was quite generous in extending those benefits in 2002, and again in 2008, it looks like they are going to go away this time, but you know, there's, it gets back to this question about expectations and really, what’s the policy makers intent with these, you know, billions and billions of dollars that they are sending out to a very wealthy segment of society, anymore. What exactly is it that they're doing with this, and you know, what are the intents? And, you know, clearly it’s to garner political support, and the fact that so much of the benefits, whether you believe one number from one study or you know, one from another, the fact is, when you start carving up 5 billion dollars a year, you know, even if its 20 percent or something, going to landlords, they're still getting a pretty big chunk of the overall benefit, so, you know, is that consistent with the intent of congress? I would imagine it is, you know, but it’s typically not what you hear when you’re listening to the policy makers rhetoric at least, so.
[28:13] Brady: Oh yea, no, I think that that's one, you know, one real take away that I'd take away from your study, and your earlier studies, as well as Barrett’s study, is that regardless, we have a whole lot of land that is owned by non-farmers and they are big beneficiaries of some portion of ag subsidies, and I think the general population, that's not the intent, or I think the general, I don't know, I can't speak for them, but I think most people don't think of that as the intent of ag policy. I think that's...
Barry: Yea, it's a good question, you know, just looking at the bigger picture of things, you've seen a real development of, sort of, I'd say that the general public's interest and understanding of agricultural policy, and you know, critical thinking about it in a lot of ways, and a lot of that has to do, that the individuals we started with, Scottie Pippen and everything we were talking about, all that became possible because of the Environmental Working Group and their database that they were able to track down to individual names and addresses, where cheques were being sent and that sort of thing. So, you know, it’s, the tax paying public is becoming a little more critical of how these dollars are spent, and you know, I think that’s good, I think that transparency is a wonderful thing, though I think it’s really being threatened quite a bit by the farm bill deliberations now moving forward, so.
[29:56] Brady: Now one aspect that I think is worthy of noting, the way, at least the way I think I'd like to get your kind of thoughts on it, you don't want, I wouldn't want to conflate the idea of concern about who the government payments are going to, with the idea of being critical of the rental market. I mean, non-farmer ownership of farm land and the rental market seem to be really healthy markets of, potentially of the farm economy, that's really different from the beneficiaries of government subsidies, in the sense...
Barry: Yea, absolutely, I mean it’s, that just one of the benefits we enjoy of living and operating in what is still, largely, a free market as you know. [Brady: right] Buyers and sellers and renters and landlords are able to work out mutually beneficial agreements, so there’s no question there I don't think, although you will hear, you know, you will hear criticism from farmers sometimes that, you know, we're being taken advance of, or landlords should not be able to raise our lease rates when you change policy and that sort of thing. [Brady: Mhmm] So it’s an interesting problem I think.
Brady: Right, right. But I mean to some extent it allows, say farmers to not have to have, to diversify their portfolio. They don’t have to have all of their assets in land; they can own a certain portion and still have production on an even larger portion because they are able to get into that rental market.
Barry: Yea, and I think, you know, it’s not unusual to see, you know, an Iowa corn grower, and Illinois corn grower, that's you know, farming 20,000 acres or something, and has 50 landlords [Brady: right] that they deal with, and the fact is, whether you believe economies of scale exist or not, I mean, I think at some level they have to when you're talking about farm size and farm, the scope of the operation, and you know, it essentially allows for efficiencies to be exploited to the extent they exist and it wouldn’t be possible for a grower to be able to produce on that many acres without going into the rental markets, and you know, dealing with a lot of different landlords in some cases.
[32:26] Brady: Let me, just ask a kind of, moving from your paper a little bit [Barry: Mhmm], and I don't know if you're really in a position to answer this, but I would be interested in your sense of, you know, what's going on currently with farmland values. We know in Canada, and its similar in the United States, we've had pretty good appreciation in farmland values over the last bit, and I would just be interested in whether you think that's being triggered by fundamentals, or potentially as I think Barry Fox says in a paper, you know, he has a paper on fundamentals and fads, and kind of differentiates between what goes on in the short run and the long run. But do you have any sense of that issue, or do you have a take on it?
Barry: Well, I think, you know, a big part of what we're seeing is just a natural consequence of very high prices which are being driven by the bio-fuels mandate, and then to some extent international growth and some of the so-called BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China. But, you know, the EPA is talking about, I think they've proposed in fact, to scale back some of the ambitious growth in the renewable fuel standard and corn prices have adjusted, they've come down a bit, and I think you'll see that impacting land values. So, I think it is all very policy driven, even if it’s not, you know, a subsidy program directly, when you have this ethanol mandate, and the effects that’s had on markets, you know, it certainly has an effect on asset values. And all you do is look at what the appreciation rates have been lately, yea, to see it, so. [Brady: Alright]. So, you know, I think the question is, back to expectations and the uncertainty of those expectations, are these policies gonna stay, or are they going to change in the future, so.
[34:31] Brady: Well put. I think in summary, its fundamentals, but policy is a part of that fundamental and expectations about those fundamentals include policy and certainly that seems to me, a big theme of your research in this area. [Barry: Mhmm] Is there anything that you would like to add, or is there any kind of, you mentioned earlier the younger economists of the podcast gets listened to not only by policy makers but also by graduate students [Barry: Mhmm] and, care to share any suggestions on where this research needs to go and what areas you think are really important in terms of...
Barry: Yea, no. It’s a good question. You know, I think our paper has got a big hole in it, because we really didn't look at the subsidized crop insurance programs that are becoming more and more and more important, I mean, that's where the money is right now. And the US farm bill, we're talking about 10 billion dollars a year, typically that's spent. So I think that we need to also consider the political economy of those programs, and there in fact have been some very interesting implications, or really, loopholes, in the WTO for how they're treated, so I think a lot of countries around the world are seeing subsisted insurance as a very popular way to subsidize farmers. So I'd encourage, you know, researchers that are looking at it to consider that and again, to the extent we can either through theory or empirics, or combination, to get a better handle on how these contracts actually, you know, are arrived at and carried out and enforced between landlords and tenants. You know, I think you could talk to an extension colleague and they could give you a lot of interesting information about what the common practices are, but it would be nice to be able to quantify that and to put it into theoretical framework in some way. And I guess one last, sort of, overall observation that we've been doing quite a bit of writing lately related to the farm bill, Vince Smith and I and Bruce Babcock’s been involved in it too, really just questioning this bigger question, this overall issue of what is the intent of congress with these policies, and exactly what are they trying to do? Who’s benefitting from these policies? And the fact is, that in the US, a farm household, agricultural households, have much higher incomes for the last several years it’s been higher, and then much, much higher wealth than non-farm households in the US, and a lot of it is driven by this very issue of land values and the appreciation there. And some of that wealth may not necessarily be terribly liquid, but it’s certainly does represent wealth, and you have a situation where we're essentially, as taxpayers, subsidizing, providing some rather large subsidy payments to, what in truth, tends to be a very wealthy, very robust, very high income segment of the economy, and as I said, I think the USDA forecasts are at 13% increase in net farm income in 2013. So, you know, it’s a paradox. I teach ag policy at the undergrad level, and I tell the students in there, you know, I've been doing this for a while now, and I’m still not completely such what it is that these policies, beyond securing political support, what it is that they're intended to do, because the things that we hear from congressional rhetoric really just, I don’t think hold up very well, you know, this is to preserve our national defense and this sort of thing, and there's probably some elements of truth in all of those things, but you know, it’s more of a puzzle than that I think, so.
[39:05] Brady: Well, that's a great charge for the future, and for our profession. Barry, thank you so much for taking the time to discuss your paper and your ideas with us today.
Barry: Yea, I appreciate it Brady, and if anybody has questions or comments, they certainly, I'd love to hear back from them and they can just drop me an email. I'm easy to find on NC States web.
[39:26] [Closing music begins.]
Brady: Yea, we'll post an email for you.
Barry: Okay, great.
Brady: Thanks for joining us at FARE Talk. We hope you will continue to check our website for updates and the latest podcast.
[39:50] [Music fades out.]
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