
Women Legislators in Africa and Foreign Aid

Henrietta A. Asiamah and Kurt Annen

Abstract

The Chamber of Deputies in Rwanda, which is currently made up of over 60 percent of women, has been the national parliament with the highest share of women legislators worldwide for over ten years now. Many other national legislators in Africa such as Senegal, South Africa, Mozambique, and others are at par with Sweden or Norway – the two countries with currently the highest share of women legislators among OECD countries. What makes this fact puzzling is that it cannot be attributed to an African electorate that values gender equality and having women in political leadership positions. In stark contrast to this, gender equality and women empowerment have successively moved up in the priority list of the international donor community over the last two decades. This raises the question of whether there is a relationship between women legislators in Africa and foreign aid allocations. We document a strong and statistically robust relationship: an increase in the share of women legislators from 15 to 20 percent is associated with an increase of about 4.3 percent in aid conditional on current levels of aid. We also show that the most effective policy instrument to implement higher women representation in national legislators in Africa is through reserved seats for women. We estimate that reserving seats for women in parliaments in a recipient country is associated with about a 53 percent increase in aid receipts. In contrast, we don't find any aid effect for quotas. Additionally, we find that democratic countries receive more aid but we do not find an interaction effect between democracy and the share of women legislators, which suggests that donors do not tailor their gender-selective aid towards more democratic countries. The results provide evidence in support of aid-selectivity for policies that improve gender equality and women empowerment in aid-recipient countries in Africa.

JEL classification: F35, F50, O10, O19

Keywords: Foreign aid allocations, women members of parliament, reserved seats, aid selectivity.


1. Introduction

The Chamber of Deputies in Rwanda which is currently made up of over 60 percent of women, has been the national parliament with the highest share of women legislators worldwide for over ten years now. Many national parliaments in Africa have a share of women legislators that is substantially above the world average such as Senegal (43%), South Africa (41%), Mozambique (39%), and many other countries.¹ What makes this fact puzzling is that it cannot be attributed to an electorate that values gender equality and having women in political leadership positions. The population share in Africa that agrees with the statement that “men make better political leaders than women do” is 62 percent, and this is substantially higher than the average of 43 percent for non-African countries.² In stark contrast, “inclusive economic growth ... and promoting social

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¹ Between 2013 and 2017, the last five years covered in this study, 22 national parliaments in Africa have an average share of women legislators that is above the world average of 20 percent during this time period.

² The men/women-leader question was asked in several rounds of the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014).


Figure 1. Share of women legislators globally (1960-2018)

Note: This figure shows the development of the average share of women legislators in national parliaments across 200 countries between 1960 and 2018 based on a new data set created by the authors.

inclusion” and commitments to “ensure gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment” have become important goals of the international donor-recipient community over the last few decades. The words in the quotation marks are all written in the *first* paragraph of the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Action Agenda (United Nations 2015), which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in July 2015. Conscientious efforts have been made by the United Nations to bridge the global gender inequality gap in the last few decades with notable movements like the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the various rounds of Financing for Development Action Agendas, where gender equality and women empowerment have successively moved up in the priority ranking over the years. If an electoral story cannot explain the high level of women participation in many African parliaments, then the question arises whether the priority shift in the international donor-recipient community towards gender issues is part of the explanation. The goal of the current paper is to investigate whether there is a link between the gender composition in parliaments and foreign aid allocations in Africa.

Women are underrepresented in most national parliaments globally. Figure 1 displays the average share of women legislators for the period 1960 to 2018.³ The figure depicts a positive trend in the share of women legislators. The average share of women is currently set at about 21 percent from below 10 percent in the 1990s and from as low as 5 percent in the 1970s. The sharp decline in the share of women legislators observed after 1990 can be attributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as quotas kept women participation in the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe high (Inglehart et al. 2003; Saxonberg 2000). In order to get a better understanding of

³ We extracted the share of women legislators from html and pdf files made available to us by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and combined that data with the Varieties of Democracy (Vdem) database (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pemstein et al. 2020). This produces to our knowledge the most comprehensive data set on the gender composition in national legislators covering 200 countries between 1960 and 2018.

Figure 2. Share of women legislators vs. GDP per capita (1960–2017)

Note: This figure shows a scatter plot between the average share of women legislators and income per capita (taken from PWT 9.1) for two periods, the 1960–1989 period (hollow dots) and the 1990–2017 period (full dots).

this dynamics, Figure 2 differentiates between the Soviet era (1960–1989) and the post-Soviet era (1990–2017). It plots the share of women legislators against the log of GDP per capita for these two time periods. We observe that the range in the share of women legislators is largely independent of income. For the period 1960-1989, we observe that Western European countries and Eastern European countries associated with the Soviet Union (e.g., Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Albania, Mongolia) have the greatest share of women legislators among all countries. In Africa, the share of women legislators is at most 10 percent for countries like Mozambique, Burundi and Rwanda. In the post-Soviet era, we observe three significant changes in the distribution of the share of women legislators worldwide. First, a sharp decline in the share of women legislators in Eastern European countries (e.g., Albania, Hungary); second, a continual increase in the share of women legislators in Western European countries (e.g., Sweden and Norway); and third, a spike in the share of women legislators for countries in Africa and a few other developing countries. For instance, the share of women legislators in Burundi's parliament rose from 5 to 22 percent whilst the share of women legislators in Albania's parliament fell from 25 to 10 percent in the post-Soviet era. Sweden's share of women legislators increased from 21 percent during 1960-1989 to 43 percent for the period 1990-2017. Norway also experienced a rise in the share of women legislators from about 21 percent in the Soviet era to about 38 percent for the period 1990-2017. For the period 1990-2017, low income countries like Rwanda and Mozambique rank high globally. From an average of 2 percent in 1970 and an average of 8 percent in 1990, women currently fill 21 percent of parliamentary seats in Africa. In 2016, women made up about 64 percent of legislators in Rwanda, the highest in the world, and Senegal had the second highest record in Africa with 43 percent of its parliamentary seats filled with women.

In this paper we focus on the role of international donors and development agencies as a possible explanation for this dynamic in Africa. What makes this explanation plausible is that gender equality and women empowerment has successively risen in the priority ranking of aid donors

over the last few decades. Given that many African countries receive considerable amounts of foreign aid, the question arises whether there is a link between the share of women members of parliament and foreign aid. We find a strong and robust relationship between the lagged share of women and current aid conditional on lagged aid using recipient-period panel data. We estimate that an increase in the share of women legislators by 10 percent for a recipient country is associated with an immediate increase of 1.3 percent in aid. In the long-run, that effect almost doubles to 2.4 percent. The result is robust to controls that are typically used in aid allocation regressions. Further, the results indicate that the increased women representation in Africa's parliaments is achieved through gender quotas in the form of reserved seats. We estimate that introducing reserved seats for women in parliament leads to 53 percent in additional aid. Our results further reveal that although democratic countries receive more aid, donors do not tailor their gender-selective aid towards more democratic African countries.

A paper that relates closely to the paper here is the cross-sectional study by Bush (2011), which examines the factors that influence the adoption of gender quotas in national parliaments. The author finds a positive correlation between international development assistance and the likelihood that a country adopts gender quotas, suggesting that a larger aid-dependence is a key factor affecting the implementation of gender quotas. Our study uses this insight as a starting point and uses panel data to exploit the time variation in aid flows to analyze aid-selectivity from a recipient country perspective where we show that conditional on existing aid amounts, recipient countries get remunerated with more aid if they increase the share of women legislators or if they adopt reserved seats for women in parliament.⁴ This suggests that aid-selectivity in terms of gender equality may incentivize recipient countries to adopt policies that increase the share of women legislators. We believe that this effect is properly identified as we control for current aid-levels and country fixed effects, and use an appropriate lag structure in our regressions. Hicks et al. (2016) study the relationship between the gender composition of national parliaments in donor countries and aid flows from donors and show that a higher share of women legislators in a donor country leads to an increase in aid efforts both in total and as a percentage of GDP. Our paper, in contrast, focuses on the gender composition of national legislatures in aid-recipient countries. With this, the current paper relates to the broader literature on aid-selectivity investigating the policy- and poverty selectivity of aid allocations (Alesina and Weder 2002; Annen and Knack 2018, 2020; Annen and Moers 2017; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levine 2006; Eichenauer and Knack 2016; Knack et al. 2011; World Bank 2005). This literature examines the extent to which aid flows are targeted to recipient countries with sound economic and political institutions. For example, Annen and Knack (2020) show that the policy-selectivity of aid has increased substantially starting in the early 1990s. They estimate that since the year 2000 more than half of the global aid budget is allocated by policy-selective donors. Note that most of this literature examines aid-selectivity from a donor-perspective by focusing on donor specific allocation decisions with the purpose to assess aid and donor quality for example (i.e. Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Easterly and Williamson 2011; Knack et al. 2011; Roodman 2012). In the study here, we focus on the recipient-perspective as it sheds light on the incentive structure for recipients to implement policy reforms produced by policy-selective aid as formally analyzed in Annen and Knack (2020). Given the large differences in donor motivations, it is important to know whether on the overall the adoption of certain policies "pays off" in terms of additional aid amounts for aid-recipient countries. We provide evidence in support of policy-selective aid for

⁴ Without controlling for existing aid flows, our coefficient on the share of women legislators almost doubles, which would be consistent with the notion that countries with larger aid amounts are more likely to implement policies that foster gender equality.


policies that improve gender equality in national parliaments in aid-recipient countries. Finally, the paper also relates to a literature that describes the gender composition in national legislatures across countries such as Wängnerud (2009), Sawer (2000), Hughes and Paxton (2019), and Sax-onberg (2000). This literature documents the evolution of women's participation in all aspects of the political process such as voting, grassroots women's mobilization, organizing and joining political parties, and getting elected to parliament, and the policies (e.g., the type of electoral system, political party ideology, political party nomination process, the strength of women's movement) that affect it.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background regarding the electoral attitudes towards gender equality in Africa, and the role of quota systems in shifting the gender composition in favor of women legislators. Section 3 documents how gender equality and women empowerment has increased in the priority rankings of the international donor-recipient community in the last two decades. Section 4 presents the quantitative analysis presenting the aid-selectivity regressions. The final section concludes the paper.

2. Background

Citizens in low income countries usually have their priorities set on access to food (i.e., three square meals), potable water, good roads, stable supply of electricity, medical supplies and health facilities, and the alleviation of poverty and are less likely to have discussions surrounding issues like gender equality, global warming, etc. Moreover, African societies are mostly known to be patriarchal and religious, whereby discriminatory practices exist within the family unit and negative stereotyping of women exist in the public space (Tøraasen 2017). The status of women is low in most African countries. Therefore it is puzzling that low-middle income countries (especially those in Africa) are recording greater shares of women legislators starting from the 1990s. Research has shown that the beliefs and attitudes of electorates influence the number of women who run for and who get elected into political positions (Arceneaux 2001; Inglehart et al. 2003; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). For instance, the religious (Muslim) leaders in Touba, the second largest city in Senegal, rebelled against the adoption of women quotas in Senegal and presented an all-male list of 100 candidates for the local elections held in 2014 (Tøraasen 2017). At the outset of the 2003 war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese government opposed the involvement of women in the peace negotiations with the excuse that women are not fighters and so cannot make any significant contributions in drafting the peace agreement (Mpoumou 2004).

We use the World Value Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014) to elucidate voter attitudes towards gender inequality. The purpose of this survey (WVS) is to measure people's beliefs and values across countries, how they change over time, and what impact they have on their social and political life. For example, one question relates to men vs. women as political leaders. Beginning in 1994, respondents were asked whether they "(a) Agree strongly, (b) Agree, (c) Disagree, (d) Strongly disagree, (e) Don't know" with the statement: "Men make better political leaders than women do". We believe that the responses to this question yield a useful proxy for the feminist attitude of the electorate across countries and time. We coded responses that either strongly agree or agree as one and all other responses as zero and then calculated the average per country for each survey year. For African countries, that measure equals 62 percent on average, which is substantially above the average of 43 percent for non-African countries. The relationship between the share of women in parliament and the share of respondents who agree than men make better political leaders than women is presented in Figure 3. This figure shows overall a fairly strong negative correlation, which is expected. However, upon closer inspection one can see that there are qual-

Figure 3. Share of women legislators vs. men/women-leader perceptions (1994–2016)

Note: This figure shows a scatter plot between the share of women legislators and “men/women-leader perception” which is the share of respondents in a country who strongly agree or agree with the statement “men make better political leaders than women do” taken from the World Value Surveys (WVS).

itative differences between African- and non-African countries. For Non-African countries, the results show a negative relationship between women legislators and men/women-leader perceptions. For countries in Africa, in contrast, we observe a positive association between these two variables. For example in Rwanda, when 45 percent of survey respondents believe that men make better political leaders, the share of women legislators is set at 38 percent and when 49 percent of survey respondents believe that men make better political leaders, the share of women legislators is set at 48 percent. We observe a similar pattern for South Africa and Zimbabwe. Table 1 investigates this relationship further using OLS and country fixed effect (FE) regressions. Column (1) confirms the overall negative correlation that can be seen in Figure 3. This regression also includes a dummy variable for Africa, which is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent. Conditional on men/women-leader perceptions, African countries have a share of women legislators that is 9.2 percentage points higher than non-African countries, which highlights again our main point for this paper that an electoral story cannot (fully) explain the high women participation in Africa legislatures. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show regression results from regressions that use sub-samples and include country fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) divide the full sample into upper and lower income countries respectively with the median GDP per capita being the divider, and Column (4) uses a sample that only includes African countries. These regressions show that the coefficient for the men/women-leader perception conditional on country fixed effects changes signs depending on whether we run this regression among upper or lower income countries. In particular, for lower income countries and African countries this correlation is positive, which is contrary to what one expects if beliefs and attitudes of the electorate should explain the gender composition in national legislators. For African countries, the coefficient is large and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Note, however, that the results in Column (4) should be taken with a grain of salt as this regression only has very few observations. We conclude that the num-

ber of women who run and win elections in Africa can hardly be linked to its citizens becoming more supportive of women being in politics.


Table 1. Share of women legislators and men/women-leader perception (1994–2016)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Men/women-leader perception	-0.3198*** (0.0372)	-0.3492*** (0.1084)	0.1949 (0.2544)	1.4841* (0.7293)
Africa	9.2111*** (2.5010)			
Constant	29.4304*** (1.8267)	31.9081*** (4.4380)	1.3095 (14.6054)	-73.0014 (45.1348)
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	197	147	58	29
R-squared	0.32	0.12	0.02	0.25
F statistic	38.68	10.37	0.59	4.14

Dependent variable is the share of women legislators in the lower chamber of national parliaments (Source: IPU and V-Dem). “Men/women-leader perception” is the share of respondents in a country who strongly agree or agree with the statement “Men make better political leaders than women do” (Source: WVS). Column (1) uses all countries with Men/women-leader perception data, Columns (2) and (3) include countries with GDP per capita above and below the median GDP per capita respectively. Column (4) includes African countries only. Recipient level cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels : * : 10 percent ** : 5 percent *** : 1 percent

Another fact that supports this claim is that the adoption of gender quotas plays an important role in explaining the share of women legislators in Africa. Given that the status of women is low in these countries, women won’t be elected into parliament in competitive elections. Instead, we observe what has been termed the “fast track” approach to the growing women’s representation in politics, that is the adoption of legislated candidate quotas and seats reserved for women in parliaments. Gender quotas come in three forms: Voluntary party quotas, legislated candidate quotas, and reserved seats. Under a voluntary party quota system, political parties self-regulate the gender composition of the candidate party lists that they submit to the Electoral Commission. For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) party in South Africa has adopted a 50 per cent gender quota for the party candidate lists that they submit to the electoral commission for their local and national elections. Under a legislated candidate quota system, political parties are required by law to regulate the gender composition of candidate lists submitted for elections. In some countries, state funding is provided to political parties who fulfill this quota requirement on their party lists. Countries may or may not impose legal sanctions on political parties who fail to meet this requirement. For example, in Senegal, the electoral commission (CENA) has the authority to reject the lists and exclude parties from competing in elections in case of non-compliance of the quota requirement (i.e. strong quota enforcement). Guinea imposes no legal sanctions on political parties that fail to meet the candidate quota requirement on their party lists (i.e. weak quota enforcement). Finally under the reserved seat system, a specified number of seats in the legislature is reserved for women. The women seats are either filled through elections involving women-only ballots (e.g. , Uganda) or filled through appointments made by leaders of the political parties (e.g. , Tanzania).⁵ While the first two quota systems regulate the gender composition among the candidates, the reserved seat system targets the women electees directly. Thus,

⁵ Table A3 in the appendix explains country by country how reserved seats are implemented in Africa.

Figure 4. Share of women legislators and quota systems in Africa (1960-2018)

The solid line graphs the average share of women legislators for countries in Africa without a quota system. The dashed line graphs the average share of countries with legislated candidate quotas and the long-dashed line is for countries with reserved seats. Data on quotas is from the Varieties of democracy (Vdem) database.

reserved seat quotas are more certain than candidate list quotas in achieving increased women participation in parliaments, particularly in societies where cultural barriers exist towards women to exercise their political rights. For instance, Burundi reserves 30 percent of its parliaments seats for women and requires that 1 in 4 candidates must be a woman. During the 2015 elections in Burundi, women made up 22 percent of the candidate lists but only 15 percent of the elected representatives were women. The remaining 15 percent had to be filled through co-optation; that is, women who obtained at least 5 percent of the votes cast but did not win the elections were selected into parliament (Brand 2018).

We focus on legislated candidate quotas and reserved seats in this study because they are implemented at the national level. Data on legislated candidate quota and reserved seat is taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) database (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pemstein et al. 2020). The list of countries who have implemented gender quotas are presented in Table A2 of the Appendix. On the overall, 61 countries have implemented gender quotas in the form of legislated candidate party lists whilst 20 countries have implemented gender quotas in the form of special seats reserved for women in parliament globally. 16 of the 61 countries (representing 26 percent) with legislated candidate quotas are in Africa whereas 12 of the 20 countries (representing 60 percent) with reserved seats quotas are in Africa. The majority of the adoption of reserved seats in Africa occurred after the 1990s, even though some countries had reserved seats for women in the 1970s (e.g., Sudan in 1974 and Tanzania in 1975). For instance, Kenya adopted reserved seats in 1997, Morocco in 2002, Rwanda in 2003, Somalia in 2004, Burundi in 2005, Zimbabwe in 2013 and Mauritania in 2013. Legislated candidate quotas were also enacted into law in Africa beginning in the 2000s. For example, candidate quotas were adopted in Djibouti in 2003, in Niger in 2004, in Angola in 2008, in Senegal in 2012 and in Guinea in 2013.

Figure 4 compares the evolution of the gender composition of African legislators for countries

without a quota system, countries with a legislated quota system (with weak or strong enforcement), and countries with reserved seats for women. The figure reveals that between 1960 and 1990 the gender composition develops fairly similar in all countries irrespective of the quota system a country would eventually adopt. Also, countries with a legislated quota system follow fairly closely the dynamics of countries without a quota-system except for the last few years. For countries with reserved seats, in contrast, we observe a strong upward divergence that starts in the year 2000. As indicated earlier, this is the time where many African countries started to implement reserved seats. Note that the average share of women legislators in African countries without a quota system equals 17 percent in 2016, which is 4 percentage points below the 2016 global average. For countries with reserved seats for women, that average is 30 percent. Table 2 shows that reserved seats for women and legislated quotas with strong punishments substantially increase the shares of women legislators in Africa. This table reports regression results that include country- and year fixed effects. Conditional on those, legislated quotas with strong punishments and reserved seats each increase the share of women by about 10 percentage points. There is no such effect for quota systems that are weakly enforced. Figure 4 and Table 2 both highlight the importance of quota systems in increasing the share of women legislators in Africa. The question, of course, remains why countries in which the status of women is low will adopt such quota systems.

Table 2. Share of women legislators and quota systems in Africa (1960–2018)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Legislated quota weak	-0.9691 (2.5063)		0.3859 (2.3964)
Legislated quota strong	8.4819** (3.3319)		10.0254*** (3.1305)
Reserved seats		8.5073** (3.2978)	8.9551*** (3.3107)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2597	2597	2597
R-squared	0.49	0.51	0.52

Note: Dependent variable is the share of women legislators in the lower chamber of national parliaments. “Quota weak” and “quota strong” refer to countries with a legislated quota system with weak and strong enforcement respectively. “Reserved seats” refers to countries with reserved seats for women in their national legislature. The quota-system data is taken from Vdem. All regressions include country - and year fixed effects that are not reported. Recipient level cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels : * : 10 percent ** : 5 percent *** : 1 percent

In this paper we focus on the role of international donors and development agencies as a possible explanation for this dynamic in Africa. What make this explanation plausible is that gender equality and women empowerment has successively risen in the priority ranking of aid donors over the last few decades as we show in the next section. Given that many African countries receive considerable amounts of foreign aid, the natural question arises whether there is a link between the share of women legislators and foreign aid.

3. Donor Aid Priorities

In 1980 the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly. A majority of countries

have ratified this document (i.e., made it official) and agreed to be bound by its provision. Every four years, world leaders are expected to submit a report to the CEDAW committee highlighting measures that they have put in place to fulfill the mandate of the treaty. CEDAW-committee members debate on the reports and make recommendations to the world leaders on how they can continue to eradicate and eliminate discrimination against women of all forms in their respective countries. Between 1980 and 2015, all African countries except Somalia and Sudan have ratified the treaty.⁶

In 1995, the fourth world conference on women was held in Beijing, dubbed “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.” This conference brought together world leaders, international organizations, and the media to advance the goals of equality, development, and peace for all women. The twelve strategic objectives and actions identified at the conference relate to poverty, education, health, the environment, and politics among others all targeted at improving the situation of women in these areas. One of the strategic objectives and actions deals with “Women in Power and Decision-making.” All governments were encouraged to “take measures to ensure women’s equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making”. This includes the following:

- Establish gender balance in governmental bodies and committees, the judiciary, and all governmental and public administration positions.
- Protect and promote the equal rights of women to engage in political activities and to freely associate.
- Recognize that shared work and parenting between women and men promote women’s increased position in public life.
- Monitor and evaluate progress on the representation of women through regular collection and analysis of data.

Political parties were also advised to:

- Examine party structures and procedures to eliminate discrimination against women’s participation.
- Develop initiatives to encourage women’s participation and incorporate gender issues in their political agenda.

The international “Financing for development” conferences have been held by the United Nations with the aim to “to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth ... and equitable global economic system”. Three conferences have been held so far: in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 (United Nations 2002), then in Doha, Qatar in 2008 (United Nations 2008), and finally in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2015 (United Nations 2015). The 2002 Monterrey conference ended with an action plan that stressed the need for development in all parts of the world to be sustainable, gender-sensitive and people-centred. As an overall commitment to a just and democratic society, achieving gender equality is a part of the *eleventh* action point listed in the Monterrey Action Agenda. The words “gender equality” and “women’s empowerment” both, however, only appear once in this policy document. The 2008 “Doha Declaration on Financing for Development” is the second International “Financing for Development” conference held by the UN, and is a follow-up conference with the purpose to review the progress in the Monterrey policy agenda. At this conference, gender equality and the empowerment of women are considered essential for economic growth, poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and development effectiveness. The UN

⁶ The median ratification year is 1989, the earliest year of ratification was done by Cape Verde in 1980 and the latest year of ratification was done by South Sudan in 2015.

called for the elimination of all forms of gender-based discrimination at this conference. Achieving gender equality made it to the *second* and *fourth* action points in the Doha Action Agenda. This is a considerable move up from the *eleventh* action point in the Monterrey Action Agenda. The increased commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment by donors is also evident in the number of times these words appear in the document: instead of two, they now appear 10 times. Finally, the third International "Financing for Development" Conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2015. This conference builds on the 2002 Monterrey and 2008 Doha conferences. At this conference, achieving gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment is now listed as part of the *first* action point. In addition, aid-recipient countries were asked to report and track the development assistance allocated for gender equality and women's empowerment issues as listed in the 53rd action point. Again, gender equality and women's empowerment both appear 8 times in this document. We believe that the evolution of these documents demonstrates the priority shift of the international donor-recipient community towards gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment in recent years.

The OECD (2018) report on aid allocations reveal that there has been an increase in gender-targeted aid allocations. Several donors have made gender equality a core priority in their aid spending. For Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, Canada, Belgium, Australia, Netherlands, and New Zealand, at least 50 percent of their aid allocations were targeted at programs and initiatives that had gender equality as the objective. Canada introduced a feminist international development assistance policy document known as the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in 2017. This aid action policy emphasizes the economic and political participation of women and girls over other avenues of gender equality in the countries that Canada awards development assistance to (Morton et al. 2020). For the period 2015-2016, seven of the ten countries that received the largest amounts of funding for programs targeting gender equality as the primary objective were in Africa (i.e., Tanzania, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda), and one third of these aid amounts was awarded to the government and civil society sector.

In the next section, we evaluate the selectivity of aid allocations to policies that advance gender equality in national legislatures.

4. Gender Selectivity of Aid Allocations

This study focuses on the share of women legislators in the lower chamber of national parliaments. We created the data set by extracting the gender composition information from HTML and PDF files, each capturing one election, that were made available to us by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU). IPU tracks elections for all its members irrespective of the quality of the members' elections. We complemented our data with the "Varieties of Democracy" database (Vdem) (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pemstein et al. 2020) producing – to our knowledge – the most comprehensive data set on the gender composition in national parliaments covering 200 countries between 1960 and 2018.⁷ As the number of legislators in parliament is only available for election years, we fill in data for the non-election years for a maximum of 5 years after an election is held. It is important to note that most aid-recipient countries included in our sample are not full fledged democracies. We measure democracy by an assessment of the competitiveness of elections using the XRCOMP measure in the Polity IV data set (see Marshall et al. 2017). This measure refers to the "Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment" and is defined as follows: "Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become su-

⁷ Combining the two data sources produces a data set that covers 22 more countries than the Vdem data set on its own.

perordinates.” (Gurr 1974, p. 1483). Marshall et al. (2017) note that “[f]or example, selection of chief executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive.” Such a country receives an XRCOMP value of 3. In our sample of aid-recipients in Africa, the median equals 1.5 for the time period covered in our regression analysis, which is between 1990 and 2017.⁸ A value of 1.5 refers to an in-between situation where “Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both” on the one hand, and a transitional arrangement “between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive elections” on the other. Only two countries, South Africa and Mauritius, have the perfect score of 3 for all the years covered in our analysis. We prefer this democracy measure over – for example – the composite measures such as “POLITY” or “POLITY2” or other composite measures such as Freedom House as this measure captures *one* important and tangible dimension of a democracy, namely whether the transfer of power is regulated and succeeds as a result of competitive elections.⁹ It is also plausible that donors are more likely to base their aid allocation decision on such a tangible and more observable property related to democracy.

Data on development assistance is taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We define total aid as the total gross flow of development aid (excluding emergency aid, food aid and debt relief) from government donors, multilateral organizations, NGOs, private foundations, and the private sector. We hereby follow Annen and Kosempel (2009) and capture development aid resulting in new cash inflows (gross aid). Aid is measured in constant USD.

All the data used in the aid allocation regressions is averaged across 4-year periods starting with the 1990–1993 period and ending with the 2014–2017 period. This is done because our main variable of interest, the share of women legislators, changes about every 4 years for the average country. In addition, averaging has the advantage of smoothing the data series, which is desirable as aid can be fairly volatile. Averaging is also beneficial for reducing the risk of a dynamic panel bias when estimating our dynamic panel model with a lagged dependent variable. Arellano-Bond tests for auto-correlation show that our estimates do not suffer from such a bias (Roodman 2009).

The amount of aid disbursed to recipient countries is modeled as a function of the share of women legislators in parliaments and other controls. The panel model is expressed as:

$$Aid_{r,t} = \alpha Aid_{r,t-1} + \beta Sharew_{r,t-1} + \delta X'_{r,t-1} + \rho_r + \gamma_t + v_{r,t} \quad (1)$$

where $Aid_{r,t}$ is the amount of development aid received by recipient country r in period t from all donors. $X_{r,t}$ comprises recipient-country specific explanatory variables in period t (e.g., population size, GDP per capita). The coefficient of interest is β . If the hypothesis that donor countries are selective to policies promoting political gender equality in recipient countries is correct, then we expect the sign of β to be positive. The regressions control for one-period lag in aid through the inclusion of $Aid_{r,t-1}$. The coefficient for the share of women legislators, β , then captures the

⁸ We focus on the post-Soviet era because this is the era that is most relevant in terms of donor aid-selectivity as discussed in the previous section and the upper bound in our time frame is dictated by data availability. The coverage of PWT 9.1 ends in 2017.

⁹ Note that for countries in which the transfer of power is unregulated – i.e. for example through forceful seizures of power – XRCOMP has a value of zero. For composite measures of democracy, typically other components of democracy enter additively into that measure. For example, POLITY2 includes also a measure on the “constraints on the executive”, which implies that competitive elections can be perfectly substituted with constraints on the executive. We don’t believe that this conflation is useful in the context here, as donors are more likely to refer to tangible and observable characteristics when making their aid allocation decisions.

additional aid amounts that a recipient country receives from aid donors when the country demonstrates commitment to political gender equality. Using this dynamic panel model also implies that changing the gender composition in the national parliament in a given period has in addition to the immediate impact measured by β also a positive longer term effect if $\alpha > 0$. That effect equals $\beta \sum_{t=0}^T \alpha^t$ after T periods or $\beta/(1 - \alpha)$ in the very long-run.

Our model includes period fixed effects denoted by γ_t . These fixed effects help to address any omitted variable bias concerns in the model caused by excluding unobserved variables that evolve over time but are constant across recipient countries. We include also aid recipient country fixed effects denoted by ρ_r . This will control for unobserved time-invariant recipient country effect. Other controls typically included in the aid literature such as colonial ties and religious beliefs of recipient countries will be absorbed by the country fixed effects. For example, the colonial past of aid-recipient countries has been shown to affect the amount of aid that a country receives (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Rajan and Subramanian 2008).

Additional controls are included in the regression equation to make the regressions comparable with other aid allocation regressions and to address possible omitted variable bias and potential endogeneity issues. For instance, if a recipient country that is more democratic also tends to have a higher share of women legislators, and if a democratic country is also likely to attract more aid then our estimate is biased if we fail to control for democracy. As indicated earlier, we use the XRCOMP measure from Polity IV to control for democracy (Marshall et al. 2017). We also include GDP per capita and population as controls as it is standard in aid allocation regressions to include these two controls. GDP per capita captures the poverty-selectivity of aid allocations and a control of population captures a well documented donor bias in aid allocations towards smaller countries (see for example Collier and Dollar 2001). As discussed earlier, donor's aid allocation have become more policy selective over the last three decades. Here we follow Annen and Knack (2020) and include the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index (CPIA) as a control. This measure is useful in the context here as it is used as part of the distribution key for the International Development Assistance funds (IDA) by the World Bank. We also include merchandise trade (as a percentage of GDP) to capture commercial interests, and temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) following Dreher and Jensen (2013). The UNSC measure controls for the political motivation behind aid donations. A recipient country, who is a member of the UNSC, may receive more aid from donors to influence the recipient country's political support in favor of donors' interests at the UNSC meetings. In an article published by Fox News on May 27, 2011, Congressman Steve Chabot, who at that time sits on the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States stated that "[i]f we are giving money to countries consistently voting against our interest, we ought to cut them off." The same article states that the US Ambassador to the U.N. at the time – John Bolton – proposed cutting off all aid allocations to 30 countries who consistently vote against the United States interests at the United Nations meetings.¹⁰ Finally, we also control for the occurrence of conflicts in recipient countries. This control may be relevant in our context as wars have been observed to lead to an increase in women empowerment through the transition of women into the labor force and subsequently into decision making roles (Mpoumou 2004; Powley 2004). If aid donors are also likely to give more aid amounts to conflict-affected countries and regions then the omission of a control for conflicts can produce an omitted variable bias. For example, "Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions" is one of the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals which aims at significantly reducing all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere, and many aid donors have made conflict-affected countries and fragile states a high priority in recent years (Collier et al. 2003; Ellison

¹⁰ Source: <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/its-all-your-money-foreign-aid-to-muslim-arab-nations>

2016; Findley 2018; World Bank 2011). Data on conflicts is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database (Pettersson and Öberg 2020; Sundberg and Melander 2013).

Table 3 presents the first regression results. The table shows that there is a positive relationship between lagged share of women in parliament and current aid for Africa in all five regressions reported in this table. Column 1 shows an overall strong correlation between these two variables without any further controls other than the period and country fixed effects. Columns 2–5 all control for lagged aid, democracy, population size, and GDP per capita and our coefficient of interest ranges between 0.12 and 0.14 depending on additional controls that are included in the regressions. We observe the estimate to be robust to the various set of controls included in the regressions. The midpoint of this interval suggests that a 10 percent increase in the share of women legislators is associated with a 1.3 percent increase in aid. For example, an increase in the share of women legislators from 15 to 20 percent is associated with a 4.3 percent increase in aid. The long-term impact of such a change holding everything else constant amounts to 7.92 percent in additional aid. The estimate on the lagged aid measure is also highly robust.

Table 3. Aid selectivity in Africa: share of women legislators (1990-2017)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log of aid, lag		0.5035*** (0.0815)	0.5073*** (0.0821)	0.4507*** (0.0812)	0.4556*** (0.0804)
Log of sharew., lag	0.1998*** (0.0564)	0.1417*** (0.0435)	0.0949 (0.0597)	0.1274*** (0.0452)	0.1356*** (0.0474)
Democracy, lag		0.0968** (0.0375)	0.0002 (0.0929)	0.1004*** (0.0370)	0.0987** (0.0370)
Log of GDPpc, lag		-0.0581 (0.1308)	-0.0566 (0.1352)	-0.0876 (0.1353)	-0.0967 (0.1261)
Log of population, lag		-0.2186 (0.3559)	-0.1305 (0.3789)	-0.5378 (0.3224)	-0.4902 (0.3828)
Log of CPIA, lag				0.4455 (0.2712)	0.4620 (0.2898)
Conflict, lag					0.0833 (0.1469)
UNSC, lag					0.1369 (0.1000)
Trade, lag					-0.0007 (0.0035)
Log of sharew × dem., lag			0.0464 (0.0371)		
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AR(1)		0.6366	0.5245	0.5142	0.6353
N	302	302	302	302	302
R-squared	0.32	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.57
F statistic	14.29	28.58	32.66	36.18	33.01

Note: The table presents estimates of the effect of the log of the share of women legislators on the log of developmental aid. See Table A1 in the Appendix for a full description and sources of all variables. The sample includes African countries between 1990 and 2017. All regressions include a constant term, period- and country fixed effect, which are not reported. Recipient-level cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels : * : 10 percent ** : 5 percent *** : 1 percent

We test for the presence of first-order serial correlation in the errors using the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. The p values from the Arellano-Bond test are reported at the bottom

of each regression results table. The null hypothesis for this test is zero autocorrelation in the disturbances. The p values from the tests are very large, therefore we fail to reject the assumption of zero serial correlation in the residuals.¹¹ We also find a positive and statistically significant aid effect of democracy almost in identical magnitudes as the share of women legislators. Column 3 includes an interaction term between the share of women legislators and democracy. We find a positive but small effect, which is not statistically significant. This implies that donors seem not to tailor their gender-selective aid towards more democratic African countries. Column 4 includes the log of the CPIA as additional control presenting thereby a similar aid allocation regression as in Annen and Knack (2020). A notable difference, however, is that this regression includes only African countries and uses 4-year period averages instead of yearly data. This regression confirms the policy-selectivity of aid allocations. In addition, our coefficient of interest increases slightly when adding this control. Income and population have the expected sign in all the regressions but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Finally, Column 5 adds the final set of controls, which do not affect our coefficient of interest.

Table 4 tests for possible channels through which gender-selective aid may work. In particular, we include a dummy variable for whether a country uses legislated candidate quotas or reserved seats in a given year. We find a strong and statistically significant aid effect for reserved seats but not for quotas. Column 1 shows an overall strong correlation between these two variables without any further controls other than the period and country fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 include additional controls, including lagged aid. We estimate a coefficient between 0.41 and 0.44 for reserved seats depending on the set of controls. The mid-point of these estimates suggests that adopting reserved seats for women legislators increases aid by 53 percent in the following period and by 77 percent in the long-run. We observe that the other controls behave very similar as in the Table 3. Columns 4 and 5 add the share of women legislators. As expected, coefficients of the share of women legislators and reserved seats reduce but they both remain positive and statistically significant. This implies that increasing the share of women in parliaments has positive aid effects independent of a reserved seat policy.

Finally, Table 5 repeats the analysis using our sample without Rwanda. We have observed that Rwanda has had the largest share of women legislators in the last ten years. All the estimates are highly robust to that change which suggests that our results are not driven by Rwanda.

5. Conclusion

This study provides a rigorous quantitative analysis for the connection between policy-selective aid and the gender composition in national parliaments among aid-recipient countries in Africa. By extracting election information from HTML and PDF files provided by the IPU and complementing this data with data on the gender composition of parliaments from Vdem (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pemstein et al. 2020), we have created a comprehensive data set on gender composition across the lower chamber of national parliaments covering 200 countries over the period 1960 to 2018. When describing this data, we observe a big jump in the share of women legislators in Africa beginning in the post-Soviet era. The analysis reveals that the growth in the number of women who run and win elections in the lower chamber of national parliaments across Africa can hardly be attributed to an improvement in the feminist attitude of its electorates. Instead, the increase in the share of women legislators in Africa can be linked to the adoption of gender quotas and reserved seats. Over the past four decades, feminist actions and efforts have been taken by

¹¹ We run this test by running the fixed effect regressions using the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator and then running the “abar” test developed by Roodman (2009) in Stata.

Table 4. Aid selectivity in Africa: quota-systems (1990-2017)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log of aid, lag		0.4831*** (0.0935)	0.4309*** (0.0912)	0.4727*** (0.0926)	0.4290*** (0.0907)
Legis. quota, lag	-0.0640 (0.1989)	-0.0531 (0.1150)	-0.0906 (0.1051)	-0.1134 (0.1250)	-0.1375 (0.1007)
Reserved seats	0.7088*** (0.1464)	0.4390*** (0.1401)	0.4135*** (0.1244)	0.3269** (0.1510)	0.3138** (0.1334)
Log of sharew., lag				0.1175** (0.0438)	0.1137** (0.0471)
Democracy, lag		0.1042*** (0.0378)	0.1053*** (0.0386)	0.1024*** (0.0355)	0.1028*** (0.0355)
Log of GDPpc, lag		-0.0614 (0.1329)	-0.0997 (0.1245)	-0.0473 (0.1378)	-0.0863 (0.1322)
Log of population, lag		-0.2651 (0.3797)	-0.5641 (0.3838)	-0.1991 (0.3664)	-0.4469 (0.3842)
Log of CPIA, lag			0.5040* (0.2529)		0.4577* (0.2677)
Conflict, lag			0.0844 (0.1622)		0.1158 (0.1572)
UNSC, lag			0.0817 (0.0923)		0.1184 (0.0982)
Trade, lag			-0.0004 (0.0034)		-0.0008 (0.0034)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AR(1)		0.7779	0.7789	0.6229	0.6211
N	302	302	302	302	302
R-squared	0.33	0.55	0.57	0.56	0.58
F statistic	20.18	37.05	32.79	30.46	33.60

Note: The table presents estimates of the effect of a quota system on the log of developmental aid. See Table A1 in the Appendix for a full description and sources of all variables. The sample includes African countries between 1990 and 2017. All regressions include a constant term, period- and country fixed effect, which are not reported. Recipient-level cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels : * : 10 percent ** : 5 percent *** : 1 percent

the United Nations and its member states to bridge the gender inequality gap that exist across the world. Further, many aid donors have taken a feminist approach to international development assistance in the last two decades. This paper investigates whether there is a relationship between women representation in parliaments across Africa and foreign aid allocations. The paper estimates that an increase in the share of women legislators by 10 percentage point for a recipient country is associated with an increase of 1.3 percent in aid on average. We also find that aid recipient countries who reserve special seats for women in parliaments receive additional 53 percent in aid amounts on average. Although we find that democratic countries receive more aid, our results show that donors do not tailor their gender-selective aid towards more democratic African countries. Our findings provide evidence in support of the growing selectivity of aid donors to gender equality and women empowerment issues in Africa. Future research will have to investigate the effectiveness of “aid-influenced” quota adoption. That is, whether women have become critical leaders (like speakers of parliament, committee chairs, more women at the negotiating table) or whether the women legislators selected into parliament truly influence policies that affect women

Table 5. Aid selectivity in Africa: share of women legislators excluding Rwanda (1990-2017)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log of sharew., lag	0.1387*** (0.0440)	0.1343*** (0.0470)	0.1106** (0.0435)	0.1081** (0.0466)
Reserved seats			0.3543** (0.1697)	0.3469** (0.1501)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
AR(1)	0.8272	0.7864	0.5879	0.5799
N	295	295	295	295
R-squared	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.57
F statistic	27.40	30.73	26.43	26.52

Note: The table presents estimates of the effect of the log of the share of women legislators on the log of developmental aid. See Table A1 in the Appendix for a full description and sources of the variables. The sample includes African countries (excluding Rwanda) between 1990 and 2017. All regressions include a constant term, period- and country fixed effect, which are not reported. Recipient-level cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels : * : 10 percent ** : 5 percent *** : 1 percent

– what has been termed as substantive representation.

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Appendix

Table A1. Variables and their definition

Variable	Definition	Source
Total Aid	Log of Total Aid disbursements in constant 2011 USD by recipient country and year.	OECD
GDP per capita	Log of Gross Domestic Product per capita (in PPP prices) by country and year.	Penn World
Population	Population size by country and year.	Penn World
Share of women	The percentage of women members of the lower chamber of the national legislature by country and year.	Data extracted from html and pdf files from IPU and complemented by data from Vdem
Democracy	If the selection of head of states is through competitive elections (XRCOMP) rated between 0 and 3 by country and year.	PolityIV
Quota	Equals 1 if a given country has statutory gender quotas for political leaders with or without sanctions in a given year.	Vdem
Reserved seat	Equals 1 if a given country has reserved seats in the legislature for women in a given year.	Vdem
Conflict	Equals 1 if a conflict involving government and rebel groups resulted in 1000 deaths or more by country and year.	Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
UNSC	Equals 1 if a country is a member of the United Nations Security Council in a given year.	UN.org
Trade	The percentage of the GDP that is associated with merchandise trade (both imports and exports) by country and year.	World Development Indicator Database
CPIA	The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index by country and year.	World Bank

Table A2. Countries who have implemented Gender Quotas/Reserved Seats in parliaments (Lower Chamber)

Country	Quota Year	Country	Quota Year	Country	Reserved Seats Year
Angola	2008	Macedonia	2002	Afghanistan	2005
Albania	2009	Mongolia	2012	Burundi	2005
Argentina	1993	Mauritania	2006	Bangladesh	1973
Armenia	2003	Mexico	2003	Egypt	1980
Algeria	2012	Montenegro	2012	Haiti	2015
Belgium	1999	Nepal	1991	Iraq	2010
Burkina Faso	2012	Nicaragua	2016	Jordan	2003
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998	Niger	2004	Kenya	1997
Bolivia	1997	North Korea	1998	Mauritania	2013
Brazil	1998	Paraguay	1998	Morocco	2002
China	2008	Peru	2000	Pakistan	1970
DRC	2011	Poland	2011	Philippines	1987
Republic of the Congo	2012	Portugal	2009	Rwanda	2003
Colombia	2014	Romania	2004	Saudi Arabia	2014
Cape Verde	2011	Senegal	2012	Somalia	2004
Costa Rica	1998	Serbia	2007	South Sudan	2015
Croatia	2015	Slovenia	2008	Sudan	1974
Djibouti	2003	Solomon Isl.	2014	Tanzania	1975
Dominican Republic	1998	South Korea	2000	Uganda	1989
Ecuador	1998	Spain	2008	Zimbabwe	2013
Egypt	2012	Timor Leste	2007		
El Salvador	2015	Tunisia	2011		
France	2002	Uruguay	2014		
Guinea	2013	Uzbekistan	2004		
Greece	2012	Venezuela	1998		
Guyana	2001	Vietnam	2016		
Honduras	2001				
Indonesia	2004				
Ireland	2016				
Iraq	2005				
Italy	1994				
Kyrgyzstan	2007				
Lesotho	2012				
Liberia	2005				
Libya	2012				

This table presents the list of all countries (in an alphabetical order) who have implemented legislated candidate quotas or reserved seats and the year in which they are implemented.

Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Database (2018).

Table A3. How reserved seat quotas are implemented (African countries)

Country	Quota %	Reserved seats/quota system
Burundi	30%	Burundi has gender quotas through party lists where 1 in 4 candidates must be a woman. If the quota does not result in 30% women representation, they make that top-up through a process of co-optation. The Electoral Administration adds, from the candidate lists that have obtained at least 5% of the votes cast, more members from the under-represented gender until the quota requirements are met.
Egypt	10%	64 seats to which the nominations was restricted to women was previously adopted. However, this has been cancelled since the 2010 election. Parties are now obliged to nominate at least one woman as part of their district candidate lists which they have to submit for the 46 districts electing 332 seats contested through a proportional system.
Kenya	13%	The constitution reserves 47 seats for women deputies to be elected from 47 counties. In every county, each political party nominates one woman onto a women-only list, voters vote and the woman who wins most of the votes in each county is selected to represent the county.
Mauritania	14%	20 women are elected on a single nation-wide women-only ballot list. Parties nominate women onto the list, voters vote and the women who win the most votes get elected into parliament.
Morocco	15%	The seats are filled by winners elected through a proportional representation system based on nation-wide closed party lists of women candidates. Each party defines a candidate list of women and voters will vote for a list. The relative vote for each list determines how many candidates from each list will be elected.
Rwanda	30%	24 women are elected from each province (2 women per province) and from the city of Kigali in a women-only ballot. They are elected by an assembly made up of various councils and committee members.
Somalia	30%	Candidates for parliamentary seats are nominated by the country's major clans and vetted by the Technical Selection Committee in compliance with the criteria outlined in the Constitution. The failure to meet the stated commitments on the 30 per cent reserved seats for women in the 2012 Federal Parliament is largely due to the lack of agreement among the clans which govern the country.
South Sudan	25%	Women members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the national level from closed party lists.
Sudan	25%	Each party will present a women-only ballot list. A voter will vote for only one women's list of their choice. Seats are allocated by the Commission according to the proportional representation among these parties. The seats shall be won by the candidates in the order in which their names appear in the party list from top to bottom.
Tanzania	29%	In 1995 and 2000, the Commission allocated the women seats based on the number of constituency seats each party won. Since 2005, the Commission has allocated these seats based on the number of popular votes each party received in the parliamentary election. Parties use different internal mechanisms to nominate special-seat candidates.
Uganda	47%	Women are elected in a separate election through a simple plurality system of women-only ballots; one woman per district. Each party nominates one woman onto the list, voters vote and the woman who wins most of the votes in each district is selected to represent the district.
Zimbabwe	22%	In each of Zimbabwe's 10 provinces, 6 women are elected under a women only party-list system of proportional representation. Each party will define a candidate list of 6 women and voters will vote for a list. The relative vote for each list determines how many candidates from each party list will be elected.

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) (idea.int)