J. Atsu Amegashie | College of Business and Economics

J. Atsu Amegashie

Professor of Economics
Department of Economics and Finance
Email: 
jamegash@uoguelph.ca
Phone number: 
ext. 58945
Office: 
MacKinnon (MCKN), Room 711

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Areas of Specialization:  Public Choice/Public Economics, Applied Game Theory; Development Economics

 J. Atsu Amegashie joined the Department of Economics at the University of Guelph in 2002. He received a BA Honours from the University of Ghana (1991), a Diploma in Economics from the London School of Economics (1994), an M.A. from Queen s University (1995), an MDE from Dalhousie University (1998) and a Ph.D. in Economics from Simon Fraser University (2002).

His work has been published in journals such as  Journal of Economics and Management StrategyJournal of Conflict Resolution; Journal of Comparative Economics; Public Choice; Games and Economic Behavior; Social Choice and Welfare; Economics Letters; and the European Journal of Political Economy.

Professor Amegashie's working papers and publications are available at: RePEc (Research Papers in Economics): https://ideas.repec.org/e/pam51.html#work

Publications

 

1. The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures: an unpleasant result. Public Choice, Vol. 99, April 1999: 57-62. [How unpleasant a result? A reply to Derek J. Clark. Public Choice, Vol. 102, March 2000: 369-372]

2. The design of rent-seeking competitions: committees, preliminary and final contests. Public Choice, Vol. 99, April 1999: 63-76.

3. Some results on rent-seeking contests with short-listing. Public Choice, Vol. 105, December 2000: 245-253.

4. An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium. Economics Letters, Vol. 70, January 2001: 79-82.

5. Committees and rent-seeking effort under probabilistic voting. Public Choice, Vol 112, September 2002: 345-350.

6. Trade liberalization and labor unions (with Toru Kikuchi). Open Economies Review, Vol 13, January 2003: 5-9 (Lead Article).

7. The all-pay auction when a committee awards the prize. Public Choice, Vol 116, July 2003: 79-90.

8. A political economy model of immigration quotas. Economics of Governance, Vol 5, November 2004: 255-267.

9. Rematches in boxing and other sporting events (with Ed Kutsoati). Journal of Sports Economics, Vol 6, November 2005: 401-411.

10. A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter. Public Choice, Vol 126, January 2006: 135-144.

11. The 2002 Winter Olympics scandal: rent-seeking and committees. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 26, January 2006: 183-189.

12. Sabotaging Potential Rivals (with Marco Runkel). Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 28, January 2007: 143-162.

13. Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence (with Bram Cadsby and Yang Song). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 59, May 2007: 213-239 (Lead Article).

14. (Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts (with Edward Kutsoati). European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 23, September 2007: 754-767.

15. Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 30, May 2008: 685-699.

16. Intentions, guilt, and social interactions. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, and Technology (Univ. of Minnesota Law School), Vol 9, April 2008: 861-882.

17. Self-selection, optimal income taxation, and redistribution. Journal of Economic Education, Vol 40, Winter 2009: 55-67.

18. American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest? Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol 33, November 2009: 265-277.

19. On third-party intervention in conflicts: an economist's view, Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, Vol. 16: Iss. 2, 2010, Article 11.

20. Incomplete property rights and overinvestment, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 37, June 2011: 81-95.

21. The paradox of revenge in conflicts (with Marco Runkel), Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 56, April 2012: 313 - 330.

22. Productive versus destructive efforts in contests. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 28, December 2012: 461-468.

23. Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence (with B. Ouattarra and E. Strobl). Economics of Governance, Vol 14, August 2013, 279-301.

24. Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 25, August 2014, 381- 400.

25. Regime spoiler or regime pawn: the military and distributional conflict in nondemocracies, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol 43, May 2015, 491–502.

26. The welfare effects of consumers' reports of bribery, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 25, Summer 2016, 516–534.

27. The nature of property rights in Haiti: mode of land acquisition, gender, and investment (with Brady Deaton and Liam Kelly), Journal of Economic Issues, forthcoming.

 

Reprints

· The 2002 Winter Olympics scandal: rent-seeking and committees. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol 26, January 2006: 183-189.

In “Forty Years of Rent-Seeking Research”, Volume 2, R. Congleton, A. Hillman, and K.A. Konrad (editors), Springer-Verlag, Germany, 2008.

· American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest? Journal of Cultural Economics, Vol 33, November 2009: 265-277.

To appear in The Economics of Music, Samuel Cameron (editor), Edward Elgar: UK.

Area of Research

microeconomics